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Misaligned Lawmaking  
Timothy Meyer* 
Since 1962, when Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act, every new 
U.S. trade deal has had the same essential bargain at its core. Congress agrees 
to give the president the power to lower trade barriers, while at the same time 
providing adjustment assistance for those workers displaced by competition 
with new imports. This bargain illustrates what I refer to as the Misalignment 
Thesis: when a legislative bargain is struck over two or more interdependent 
policies, the policy subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation and 
implementation will be disfavored in the long run. In the trade context, the 
misalignment occurs because trade liberalization commitments are indefinite, 
enshrined in international agreements, and implemented by the executive 
branch; the adjustment assistance provisions are temporary, purely domestic, 
and require renegotiation and reauthorization in Congress. 
 As a consequence, proponents of policies to help displaced workers must 
constantly renegotiate and defend laws to help their constituents. Moreover, 
they must do so within an institution, Congress, in which the transaction costs 
of securing favorable policy outcomes are very high. The result is that policies 
aimed at helping workers displaced by trade liberalization are chronically 
undersupplied. 
 Proponents of trade liberalization, on the other hand, never have to 
renegotiate their gains. Each trade agreement goes into the pocket of trade 
proponents, and then they move on to securing the next trade agreement. Nor 
does Congress maintain a meaningful role in the implementation of trade 
agreements. Once an agreement is in effect, implementation is left to the 
executive branch, where the transaction costs of enacting a trade-liberalizing 
agenda are quite low. 
This Article makes three contributions. First, it introduces the 
Misalignment Thesis in the context of U.S. trade policy. The Misalignment 
Thesis is a descriptive claim about how the structure of a legislative bargain 
 
 * Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I would like to thank Adam Chilton, 
Evan Criddle, Brian Fitzpatrick, Susan Franck, Morgan Ricks, Chris Serkin, Suzanna Sherry, 
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influences the long-term stability and effectiveness of that bargain. Second, the 
Article introduces the normative corollary to the Misalignment Thesis: if 
political stability hinges on respecting the legislative bargain, interdependent 
policies should be subject to renegotiation on the same timeline and 
implementation on the same terms. In light of this prescription, I offer three 
concrete proposals for aligning trade liberalization and trade adjustment 
assistance in order to protect and promote the goals of both policies. Most 
importantly, I argue—contrary to most commentary—that the Trump 
Administration’s proposal to limit the duration of trade agreements like NAFTA 
would better align trade liberalization and trade adjustment assistance. Third, 
the Article discusses the Misalignment Thesis’s broader application to 
deregulatory bargains struck in a wide variety of fields, including 
transportation, telecommunications, and healthcare. The Misalignment Thesis 
suggests that deregulation often has unintended consequences because the 
structure of deregulatory bargains undermines their long-term effectiveness.   
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INTRODUCTION  
President Trump has made international trade one of the central 
policy issues for his Administration.1 In 2018, the Trump 
Administration completed tense negotiations with Mexico and Canada 
over revisions to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”).2 The resulting agreement has faced uncertain prospects for 
legislative approval in Canada and the United States,3 although further 
negotiations in late 2019 appear to have cleared the path for the revised 
agreement’s approval in early 2020.4 In March 2018, the United States 
completed the renegotiation of the United States–South Korea free 
trade agreement (“KORUS”).5 President Trump has also reportedly 
mulled withdrawing from the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).6 In 
response, the European Union (“EU”) has proposed renegotiating 
certain aspects of the WTO to which the United States has long 
 
 1. See, e.g., Andrew Restuccia & Doug Palmer, White House Preparing for Trade Crackdown, 
POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/07/trump-trade-crackdown-
327283 [https://perma.cc/V8CW-3J3A] (“President Donald Trump’s administration is preparing to 
unveil an aggressive trade crackdown in the coming weeks that is likely to include new tariffs 
aimed at countering China’s and other economic competitors’ alleged unfair trade practices, 
according to three administration officials.”) 
 2. Alan Rappeport, U.S. and Canada Reach Trade Deal to Salvage Nafta, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/us/politics/us-canada-nafta-deal-deadline.html 
[https://perma.cc/7UAU-FV9P].  
 3. Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexico Becomes First Country to Ratify New North American Trade 
Deal, WASH. POST (June 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexico-
becomes-first-country-to-ratify-usmca-north-american-trade-deal/2019/06/19/500dd8c0-92b3-
11e9-956a-88c291ab5c38_story.html [https://perma.cc/V97Z-CGGZ] (describing the potential 
difficulties the new treaty faces in the United States and Canada).  
 4.  William Mauldin & Natalie Andrews, House Passes North American Trade Pact with 
Bipartisan Support, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2019, 5:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/usmca-
clears-threshold-to-pass-in-the-house-with-bipartisan-support-11576790200 [https://perma.cc/ 
Y6CJ-N577]. 
 5. Tori K. Whiting, Analyzing the Renegotiated U.S.–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), 
HERITAGE FOUND. 1 (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-
04/IB4838_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YYB-TLSS].  
 6. Gabriella Muñoz, Trump Mulls Pulling the U.S. Out of the World Trade Organization: 
Report, WASH. TIMES (June 29, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jun/29/ 
donald-trump-mulls-pulling-the-us-out-of-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/3QK6-369Y]. 
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objected,7 while Canada has convened a group of nations to tackle more 
comprehensive WTO reform.8 
Renegotiating these agreements represents an unprecedented 
opportunity—and a huge risk. WTO rules are the foundation of a global 
economy that supports millions of jobs worldwide and facilitates 
trillions of dollars’ worth of global trade. Canada and Mexico are the 
United States’ top trading partners after China, while South Korea is 
the United States’ sixth-largest trading partner.9 These three countries 
alone accounted for over $1 trillion in goods traded with the United 
States in 2016—more than a quarter of the United States’ international 
trade in goods.10 Revamping these agreements offers the United States 
the opportunity to consider what international trade policy should look 
like in the twenty-first century.11 The foundations of that trading 
system have remained largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War, 
when nations created NAFTA (1994), the WTO (1995), and a raft of 
other free trade agreements around the world.12 
This Article argues that these renegotiations represent an 
opportunity to correct a critical misalignment in trade policy. Since 
1962, when Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act, every new U.S. 
trade deal has had the same essential bargain at its core.13 Congress 
agrees to give the president the power to lower trade barriers, while at 
 
 7. See Philip Blenkinsop, EU Set to Push for WTO Reform to Ease Global Trade Tensions, 
REUTERS (June 19, 2018, 8:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-wto-eu/eu-set-to-
push-for-wto-reform-to-ease-global-trade-tensions-idUSKBN1JF1V0 [https://perma.cc/K6V5-
5VVR] (“EU leaders will meet . . . to discuss a range of issues, including . . . trade, which has taken 
on added importance after U.S. President Donald Trump imposed important tariffs on EU steel 
and aluminum.”).  
 8. Canada to Host Meeting on WTO Reform, U.S. and China Left Out for Now, REUTERS 
(July 27, 2018, 12:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-canada/canada-to-
host-meeting-on-wto-reform-u-s-and-china-left-out-for-now-idUSKBN1KH26V [https://perma.cc/ 
MQF2-2XUN].  
 9. Top U.S. Trade Partners, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/ 
groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/K6F8-BJ7L]. South Korea’s ranking, while listed as seventh by exports, is sixth 
by combined value of imports and exports. See id. These statistics measure trade in goods only, 
not trade in services or cross-border investments. Id. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s trade agreements, necessitated by Brexit, and the 
negotiation of new EU trade agreements, offers a similar opportunity for countries around the 
world.  
 12. Other major trade agreements created in the early 1990s include the Treaty of Asuncion, 
which created Mercosur, a customs union comprising much of South America, see Treaty 
Establishing a Common Market art. 1, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, as well as the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which deepened European integration through the creation of the European Union 
and laid the foundation for the adoption of the euro as a common currency, see Treaty on European 
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. 
 13. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat. 872, 879–80 
(repealed 1974).  
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the same time providing assistance for those workers displaced by 
competition with new imports. The misalignment occurs because the 
trade liberalization commitments are indefinite, enshrined in 
international agreements, and implemented by the executive branch; 
the assistance provisions are temporary, purely domestic, and require 
renegotiation and reauthorization in Congress.  
As a consequence, proponents of policies to help displaced 
workers must constantly renegotiate and defend laws to help their 
constituents. Moreover, they have to do so within an institution, 
Congress, in which the transaction costs of implementation are very 
high. The result is that policies aimed at helping workers displaced by 
trade liberalization are chronically undersupplied. 
Proponents of trade liberalization, on the other hand, have not, 
until recently, ever had to renegotiate their gains. Each trade 
agreement the United States concludes goes into the pocket of free trade 
proponents, and then they move on to securing the next trade 
agreement. Nor does Congress maintain a meaningful role in the 
implementation of trade agreements. Once an agreement is in effect, 
implementation is left to the executive branch, where the transaction 
costs of enacting a trade-liberalizing agenda are quite low.  
This Article introduces the Misalignment Thesis, which explains 
this dynamic. The Misalignment Thesis has both a descriptive and a 
normative component. The descriptive Misalignment Thesis states that 
when a legislative bargain is struck over two or more interdependent 
policies, the policy that is subject to more frequent or costlier 
renegotiation and implementation will be disfavored in the long run. 
The normative corollary is that if political stability hinges on respecting 
the legislative bargain, the policies should be subject to renegotiation 
on the same timeline and implementation on the same terms.  
This misalignment is most evident in situations in which the 
government moves from using a single policy instrument to implement 
two policy goals to using two separate policy instruments to achieve the 
same two goals. I refer to this process as decoupling. As long as only a 
single policy instrument is in use, proponents of both policy goals are 
ensured a seat at the bargaining table. For example, when the 
government seeks to use trade barriers to both promote international 
trade and support workers and import-competing industry, proponents 
of each of these goals have leverage. When each policy goal has its own 
policy instrument, however, the two policies no longer need to be 
negotiated together. Consequently, proponents of the more frequently 
renegotiated policy instrument may not be able to use support for the 
other policy as leverage in negotiations to achieve their primary goal. 
They may thus see their policy gains erode over time. This prediction, 
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grounded in how the law structures the renegotiation and 
implementation of interdependent policies, flies in the face of a 
significant body of political and economic thinking that holds that 
interdependent policies should be negotiated and implemented 
separately for reasons of efficiency.14 
I develop the Misalignment Thesis primarily in the context of 
U.S. trade policy, although as I explain below it has broad application 
to a number of areas in which the federal government has deregulated 
the economy. The descriptive Misalignment Thesis, I argue, explains 
the current crisis in U.S. trade policy.15 Economists, trade lawyers, and 
policymakers have for a long time maintained that trade liberalization 
should be achieved through international agreements, and any 
redistribution necessary to compensate those harmed by trade 
liberalization should be worked out as a matter of domestic law.16 In 
significant parts of the developed world, including the United States, 
that domestic redistribution has not occurred on the scale necessary to 
address the plight of dislocated workers.17 The election of Donald 
Trump on a protectionist platform in the United States, British voters’ 
 
 14. See, e.g., PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY 
AND POLICY 216 (7th ed. 2005); N. Gregory Mankiw, Why Economists Are Worried About 
International Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/business/ 
trump-economists-trade-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/5PZ9-YP2A] (arguing that dislocations 
caused by trade liberalization may require domestic programs, such as a robust social safety net, 
but do not undermine the case for trade liberalization); see also Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade 
Agreements for Social Inclusion, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (describing and critiquing the “two-
step” model of trade policy). 
 15. It may also have something to say about the similar crisis in Europe, as well as other 
deregulatory bargains struck within the United States. See infra Part I. In the interest of space, I 
focus here on the experience in U.S. trade policy, deferring to future research the application of 
the Misalignment Thesis to other countries and fields.   
 16. See, e.g., KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 14, at 216: 
It is always preferable to deal with market failures as directly as possible . . . . Any 
proposed trade policy should always be compared with a purely domestic policy aimed 
at correcting the same problem. If the domestic policy appears too costly or has 
undesirable side effects, the trade policy is almost surely even less desirable . . . .; 
Shaffer, supra note 14, at 4 (acknowledging “the trade establishment’s traditional approach of 
calling for complementary domestic policy in parallel to trade liberalization,” but arguing it is “no 
longer sufficient”); Simon Lester, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the 
World Economy, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 409, 414 (2011) (book review) (“[I]s a 20% tariff on foreign 
goods really the best way to protect domestic labor standards?”); see also Timothy Meyer, Saving 
the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985, 993–97 (2017) (discussing 
conventional thinking on the relationship between trade liberalization and domestic 
redistribution).  
 17. See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 18 (2012) (“People demand compensation against risk when their economies are 
more exposed to international economic forces . . . .”); Lawrence Summers, A Strategy to Promote 
Healthy Globalization, FIN. TIMES (May 4, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/999160e6-1a03-
11dd-ba02-0000779fd2ac [https://perma.cc/S77H-VJZM] (“[W]hat is good for the global economy 
and its business champions was not necessarily good for [workers] . . . .”).  
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decision to leave the European Union, and significant electoral support 
for antiglobalization candidates and right-wing political parties in 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Hungary, and the 
Netherlands all testify to the inadequacy of government efforts to cope 
with the domestic effects of globalization.18 U.S. participation in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)—a free trade agreement between 
twelve nations that President Obama negotiated to establish the “rules 
of the road” for twenty-first-century trade—has already been a casualty 
of this backlash.19  
The Misalignment Thesis posits that the inadequacy of 
redistribution is a product of trade law’s domestic architecture in the 
United States. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 decoupled 
international trade policy from government support for workers and 
import-competing sectors. It did so by creating the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (“TAA”) program, the core component of trade-related 
redistribution since 1962.20 The program provides financial aid to 
workers, farmers, and firms hurt by competition from imports.21 Yet 
precisely because it involves financial aid, TAA creates spending 
commitments that Congress must reauthorize from time to time. Not 
 
 18. See Auxit, Frexit, Nexit? EU Countries May Hold Referendums Following ‘Brexit’ Vote, RT 
NEWS (June 23, 2016, 8:52 PM) https://www.rt.com/viral/348039-brexit-eu-referendum-domino/ 
[https://perma.cc/XYU8-5YWZ] (“As UK citizens head to the polls for the ‘Brexit’ vote, many are 
speculating the move could have a domino effect across Europe.”); Jon Stone, Nearly All EU States 
‘Could Follow Britain’s Lead and Leave the Union,’ Senior French MP Warns, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 
27, 2016, 4:45 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brexit-eu-referendum-
britain-france-leave-vote-union-a7331426.html [https://perma.cc/7YVA-BXAU] (quoting a 
member of the French Parliament as saying that “what happened in the UK at the referendum 
could have happened [in] almost every other country in the European Union—except in the other 
countries no Prime Minister would have been as irresponsible as to ask for a referendum”); Jan 
Eichhorn, Christine Hübner & Daniel Kenealy, The View from the Continent: What People in Other 
Member States Think About the UK’s EU Referendum, APPLIED QUANTITATIVE METHODS NETWORK 
(2016), https://www.research.aqmen.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2017/07/TheViewFromThe 
Continent_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3PN-5YDH] (describing the various views of EU 
citizens in regard to Brexit). 
 19. See Nicholas Loffredo, Trump Says Withdrawal From TPP a ‘Great Thing for the 
American Worker,’ NEWSWEEK (Jan. 23, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-
withdrawal-tpp-great-thing-american-worker-547109 [https://perma.cc/42RA-5UBZ] (reporting 
the Trump Administration’s decision to “act[ ] on a key campaign promise” by withdrawing from 
the TPP); Barack Obama, Opinion, The TPP Would Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on 
Global Trade, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-
obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-
0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html [https://perma.cc/423A-UR3Z] (“As a Pacific power, the 
United States has pushed to develop a high-standard Trans- Pacific Partnership, a trade deal that 
puts American workers first and makes sure we write the rules of the road for trade in the 21st 
century.”).  
 20. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (2012). 
 21. See Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming the Law of Trade 
Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 797, 799 (2012) (discussing how trade adjustment assistance 
works). 
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surprisingly, TAA’s successful reauthorization or extension tends to 
coincide with the negotiation of new trade agreements, such as NAFTA 
or TPP.22  
When new trade negotiations have not been on the table, 
however, Congress has cut back on TAA. In 1981, Congress significantly 
cut benefits under TAA.23 In 1986, it let the program temporarily 
lapse.24 The Reagan Administration proposed abolishing it entirely.25 
After a series of short extensions during the Obama Administration, the 
program is currently set to expire in 2021.26  
Trade agreements suffer no such headwinds. A U.S. trade 
agreement remains in force unless and until one state party terminates 
it.27 So too does the domestic implementing legislation.28 Consequently, 
after Congress has approved a trade agreement, the gains and losses 
from trade liberalization are locked in, subject only to the executive’s 
willingness to consider using termination or violation as a threat to 
spur renegotiation.  
 
 22. See Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (codified 
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3437 (2012)).   
 23. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2501–2529, 95 Stat. 
357, 881−93 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
 24. See J. F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41922, TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE 
(TAA) AND ITS ROLE IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 9 (Aug. 5, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41922.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/64AY-628F] (describing the circumstances leading up to, and following, the 
three-month lapse in 1986). 
 25. Id. 
 26. § 403, 129 Stat. at 374 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2318(b)(1) (2012)). 
 27. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic 
of Korea, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 24.5, June 30, 2007, (entered into force Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter 
KORUS], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [https:// 
perma.cc/3XLW-ZVHD]; North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 2205, Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].   
 28. See United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, 
§ 107, 125 Stat. 428, 432 (2011) (sunsetting the domestic legislation in the event the agreement 
terminates); North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 
§ 109, 107 Stat. 2057, 2067–68 (1993) (explaining what happens in the event of termination). 
Implementation acts for all agreements after NAFTA contain provisions, like section 107 of the 
United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, that purport to sunset the 
legislation if the United States withdraws from or terminates an international agreement. 
However, these provisions are of dubious constitutionality under Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417 (1998), which held that Congress could not delegate to the president authority to repeal 
a statute. See Tim Meyer, Trump’s Threat to Withdraw From NAFTA May Hit a Hurdle: The US 
Constitution, SALON (Aug. 25, 2017, 1:43 AM), https://www.salon.com/2017/08/24/trumps-threat-
to-withdraw-from-nafta-may-hit-a-hurdle-the-us-constitution_partner/ [https://perma.cc/6B4E-
DHN6] (commenting that “[t]he same logic [from Clinton] should apply to trade agreements”); Joel 
Trachtman, Trump Can’t Withdraw From NAFTA Without a ‘Yes’ From Congress, HILL (Aug. 16, 
2017, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/346744-trump-cant-
withdraw-from-nafta-without-a-yes-from [https://perma.cc/FYH6-T2MF] (noting that Congress 
“has steadfastly avoided delegating power to the president to terminate trade agreements”).  
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Even more importantly, the largest gains from trade 
liberalization come from early agreements like NAFTA and the WTO 
Agreements.29 According to the U.S. Trade Representative, the average 
trade-weighted tariff on industrial goods imported into the United 
States is 2%, and half of such goods enter duty free.30 For this reason, 
later agreements, like TPP, have only small effects in terms of overall 
U.S. GDP.31 That means trade liberalization’s proponents may not be 
inclined to give up much to get the next trade deal, even though much 
of the dislocation from trade has already been created and locked in by 
earlier trade agreements.  
This bargaining dynamic is not inevitable. The normative 
Misalignment Thesis suggests that we can and should reform the 
system to ensure that all sides have a stake in the success of both trade 
liberalization and adjustment policies. Doing so requires making 
credible commitments to renegotiate and implement trade 
liberalization and adjustment assistance on the same timelines and 
with the same fervor. This alignment can be accomplished in at least 
three ways. First, adjustment assistance policies could be embedded in 
trade agreements themselves, subjecting assistance policies to the same 
timelines and implementation requirements as trade liberalization 
commitments. Second, trade agreements could include sunset clauses 
or periodic reviews that mirror the time limits on TAA’s authorization. 
Third, TAA could take the form of indirect spending commitments that 
would not require constant reauthorization by Congress.  
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the history of 
the relationship between regulating market access for foreign products 
and supporting the labor market. Historically, the United States used 
trade barriers to pursue both of these policy goals. I then explain how 
the creation and implementation of TAA decoupled adjustment 
assistance for workers and industries hurt by trade liberalization from 
trade liberalization policies themselves. This Part traces TAA from its 
beginnings in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act through the most recent 
legislation extending trade adjustment assistance in 2015, comparing 
 
 29. See RODRIK, supra note 17, at 57–58 (explaining that the ratio of redistribution-to-
efficiency gains from trade liberalization gets higher with additional trade agreements).  
 30. Industrial Tariffs, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-
areas/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
H523-FGHJ].  
 31. See id. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that over the first fifteen 
years of its existence, TPP would add only 0.15% of annual GDP growth to the U.S. economy. U.S. 
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: LIKELY IMPACT ON THE U.S. 
ECONOMY AND ON SPECIFIC INDUSTRY SECTORS 69–70 (2016), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/ 
332/pub4607.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ6C-YVPH]. Given the size of the U.S. economy, though, this 
modest growth would still have equaled $42.7 billion. Id. at 69. 
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how adjustment assistance and trade liberalization policies evolved 
after their decoupling in 1962. It also situates this decoupling within 
the economic and policy arguments that justify it on efficiency grounds. 
Part II introduces and unpacks the descriptive Misalignment 
Thesis: when a legislative bargain is struck over two or more 
interdependent policies, the policy subject to more frequent or costlier 
renegotiation and implementation will be disfavored in the long run. 
Misalignment requires that three conditions be satisfied. First, two 
policies, such as market access and labor market support, must be 
interdependent. Shifts in one policy create costs for proponents of the 
other policy that in turn create demand for a policy response. Second, 
the two policies must be decoupled, such that each policy has its own 
policy instrument. Trade agreements and their domestic implementing 
legislation regulate market access and trade liberalization, while trade 
adjustment assistance provides labor market support. Decoupling saps 
political support for using one instrument to accomplish two purposes. 
Third, the law must not create credible commitments to renegotiate the 
two policies at the same time or implement them in the same manner. 
The absence of such credible commitments deprives proponents of the 
policy subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation or 
implementation of the political leverage they need to sustain their 
policy gains. As a result, the long-term stability of the entire legislative 
bargain is threatened. This instability explains the current crisis in 
U.S. trade policy. Trade adjustment assistance proponents lost 
negotiating leverage with the creation of TAA because most of the time 
Congress can cut funding or decline to extend or amend TAA without 
negatively impacting trade liberalization. Trade liberalization 
proponents thus have little reason to support adjustment assistance 
policies.    
Part III takes up the normative Misalignment Thesis by 
analyzing three techniques by which Congress and the president can 
align negotiations over trade liberalization and adjustment assistance 
more effectively. First, the government can enshrine adjustment 
assistance obligations in international agreements, making them 
indefinite and subject to implementation on the same terms as trade 
liberalization commitments. Second, future trade agreements could 
include sunsets or periodic reviews that are timed to coincide with the 
review of adjustment assistance policies. Third, Congress could reduce 
renegotiation of adjustment assistance policies domestically by 
providing such assistance for longer terms or through mechanisms, 
such as tax expenditures, that Congress does not need to reauthorize.   
Part IV concludes by considering how the Misalignment Thesis 
can explain the unintended consequences of deregulatory bargains 
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struck in a wide range of areas, including transportation, 
telecommunications, and healthcare. In these areas and others, the 
government has historically taxed or regulated the economy in a 
manner that provides an implicit subsidy for goods and services that 
might not otherwise be cost-competitive.32 Beginning in the mid-
twentieth century, however, the government deregulated many of these 
industries, replacing the implicit subsidy provided by government 
regulation with direct subsidies in the form of financial payments from 
the government. In so doing, the government decoupled the goals of 
promoting efficiency and competition in the regulated sectors from the 
goal of ensuring the availability of goods and services in unprofitable 
markets. Policymakers and scholars argued that direct subsidies would 
be more efficient for the economy as a whole, better at achieving the 
subsidies’ aims, and more politically accountable. But in most of these 
fields, just as in trade, direct subsidies have failed to achieve their 
objectives. This failure presents a puzzle the Misalignment Thesis can 
help explain.  
I. DECOUPLING TRADE REGULATION AND LABOR SUBSIDIZATION   
This Part traces the historical relationship between U.S. 
international trade policy and support for domestic labor markets. This 
relationship has followed a familiar deregulatory arc. Historically, the 
government used its power over international trade to pursue multiple 
policy goals: regulating market access and protecting domestic 
industries and labor. In the middle of the twentieth century, though, 
the government began reducing barriers to market access—a gradual 
deregulation of international trade that hurt these protected domestic 
interests. The government sought to offset the costs to these domestic 
interests directly through subsidies designed to support economic 
adjustment. But those subsidies failed to deliver on their promise. 
 
 32. Throughout this Article, I use the term “subsidy” in the general sense of government-
directed financial support. I do not use the term in the narrow, technical sense defined by art. 1 of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”). See Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BA6L-3C4Q]. Indeed, the inadequacy of that definition has been one source of 
the current trade tensions between the United States and China. China provides significant 
financial support to Chinese industries through a variety of means, but due to the narrow 
definition of a subsidy in the SCM Agreement, WTO members have little recourse against these 
practices. See David Lawder, U.S. Business Groups Say WTO Unable to Curb Many Chinese Trade 
Practices, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2017, 3:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade/u-
s-business-groups-say-wto-unable-to-curb-many-chinese-trade-practices-idUSKBN1C92UL 
[https://perma.cc/G4J4-XHGT].  
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Section I.A introduces the basic theory of international trade 
law. Higher trade barriers protect domestic industries and their labor 
forces at the expense of foreign producers and domestic consumers. 
Lower trade barriers, on the other hand, benefit domestic consumers 
and foreign producers at the expense of domestic producers. Trade 
policy, in other words, impacts both market access and support for 
domestic industries and labor.  
Section I.B provides the historical context for this relationship. 
Although rarely defended as such in modern times prior to the Trump 
Administration, U.S. trade policy has historically been a vehicle for 
providing indirect subsidies to certain segments of the American 
economy. That began to change in the mid-twentieth century with the 
creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), the 
vehicle through which nations gradually reduced their tariffs. In 1962, 
the United States decoupled the regulation of international trade from 
support for labor markets through the creation of the TAA program. As 
this Section explains, this decoupling is in line with conventional 
economic thinking that argues that trade regulation should be a 
separate enterprise from labor market support.  
Section I.C traces the subsequent development of TAA and trade 
liberalization. Congress has repeatedly cut or failed to reauthorize TAA. 
The program has only gained traction at moments when trade 
liberalization’s proponents have sought to conclude additional trade 
agreements. In between, trade adjustment assistance has languished. 
Section I.D explains the cost of TAA’s neglect. Economic data makes 
clear that, while trade liberalization has been an enormous boon to the 
U.S. (and global) economy, it has created concentrated costs for certain 
workers and communities to which they have not adjusted. The puzzle, 
to which Part II will turn, is why decoupling trade liberalization and 
adjustment assistance has failed so spectacularly.  
A. The Costs and Benefits of Trade Liberalization 
Trade policy is inherently distributional. On the one hand, 
reducing government restrictions on the consensual exchange of goods 
and services—what we usually mean by “freeing” or liberalizing trade—
creates significant wealth. Free trade enables countries to specialize in 
producing those goods and services in which they have a comparative 
advantage and trade for everything else.33 As a consequence, consumers 
gain access to cheaper products. In this way, removing government 
 
 33. For a basic presentation of the idea of comparative advantage, see JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, 
ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 12–16 (3d ed. 2016). 
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restrictions on international trade acts like an economy-wide tax cut.34 
Instead of paying $5 for a gallon of milk, milk drinkers pay only $3. The 
same is true for every product or service that can be imported more 
cheaply than it can be produced in the home country. The overall gains 
to consumers are vast.  
Nor are the gains limited to the end-use consumer. Modern trade 
agreements are as much about supply chains as about trade in finished 
products.35 Companies can often purchase intermediate products, such 
as component parts of a final product, more cheaply from foreign 
producers due to trade liberalization than they would otherwise be able 
to.36 Some of these savings may go into the companies’ pockets, while 
some savings may be passed on to the end-use consumer. Either way, 
workers employed by the firm can gain through expanded employment. 
The U.S. auto industry illustrates the point. NAFTA allowed U.S. 
automakers to acquire cheaper car parts from Mexico, making U.S. 
automakers more competitive.37 Many have argued that the cost 
savings from NAFTA saved the U.S. auto industry.38  
Finally, trade liberalization helps exporters. In addition to 
gaining access to cheaper intermediate goods, exporters also gain access 
to foreign markets for their final products through the reciprocal 
 
 34. See Trade, at What Price?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.economist.com/united-
states/2016/04/02/trade-at-what-price [https://perma.cc/7H34-W89C] (“Robert Lawrence and 
Lawrence Edwards, two economists, estimate that trade with China alone put $250 a year into the 
pocket of every American . . . .”); Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND (Nov. 2001), https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm#i 
[https://perma.cc/59V6-4HH4] (“Integration into the world economy has proven a powerful means 
for countries to promote economic growth . . . .”). 
 35. See Trevor W. Nagel & Elizabeth M. Kelley, The Impact of Globalization on Structuring, 
Implementing, and Advising on Sourcing Arrangements, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 619, 619–20 (2007) 
(including “the expansion of free trade” among the factors that have facilitated manufacturing 
corporations’ development of global supply chains). 
 36. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Cathleen Cimino & Tyler Moran, NAFTA at 20: Misleading 
Charges and Positive Achievements, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 7 (May 2014) 
https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb14-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ2G-Z7E8] 
(noting that “imports benefit not just US consumers but also US firms that can acquire just the 
right intermediate components at the right price”).  
 37. See Elena Holodny, Trump Wants to Renegotiate NAFTA—Here’s What You Need to 
Know, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 5, 2017, 9:44 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-nafta-is-it-
good-for-america-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/26ZM-DW59] (noting that “Mexico can build cars more 
efficiently than the US” because of cheaper labor and parts). 
 38. See Eduardo Porter, Nafta May Have Saved Many Autoworkers’ Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/business/economy/nafta-may-have-saved-many-
autoworkers-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/WR6C-FKLR] (“[T]here is a good case to be made that 
without Nafta, there might not be much left of Detroit at all.”); see also Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 
Dan Brooks & Martin Mulloy, The Decline and Resurgence of the U.S. Auto Industry, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. 18–19 (May 6, 2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/the-decline-and-resurgence-of-the-us-
auto-industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/78G5-7RG7] (describing how NAFTA influenced the growth of 
the auto industry). 
3_Meyer (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:22 AM 
164 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1:151 
exchange of trade commitments among countries. To understand the 
significance of this market access, one need only look at the value 
American companies put on access to Chinese markets as trade 
between the two countries liberalized. For example, Coca-Cola had only 
just entered China in 1979; by 2014, the country had become Coca-
Cola’s third-largest market.39 Two trade-liberalizing events help 
explain this massive growth: the first United States–China trade 
agreement in 1979 and Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001.40   
But while the economy as a whole, and many actors in it, benefit 
from lower trade barriers, certain sectors of the economy—those that do 
not compete effectively with cheaper foreign imports—benefit from high 
trade barriers. To see how, consider tariffs on steel imports, which both 
Presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump imposed in an effort to 
shore up electoral support in midwestern states.41 Steel tariffs—just 
taxes on imported steel—make imported steel more expensive relative 
to domestic steel, which is not subject to any additional tax. By 
increasing the price of imported steel and aluminum, the tariffs allow 
U.S. producers to increase their own prices, sell more of their product 
(because their goods become cheaper relative to imports), or some 
combination of the two. At the same time, tariffs also increase the price 
consumers pay. Consequently, domestic consumers of steel, primarily 
manufacturers, will purchase more steel from American steel 
manufacturers, and at higher prices than they would pay in the absence 
of tariffs.  
The additional sales at a higher price constitute the American 
steel producers’ indirect regulatory subsidy. Unlike a direct subsidy, 
which comes from the government, the subsidy here comes from the 
manufacturers that purchase steel. The premium that the steel 
companies receive is, however, still effectively a subsidy because it is a 
result of government regulation.42 By imposing a tariff (or other trade 
 
 39. Scott Cendrowski, Opening Happiness: An Oral History of Coca-Cola in China, FORTUNE 
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/09/11/opening-happiness-an-oral-history-of-coca-cola-in-
china/ [https://perma.cc/X8RP-X5LN]. 
 40. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s 
Republic of China, China-U.S., July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1980). China 
entered the WTO in 2001. See World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s 
Republic of China, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Protocol on China’s 
Accession]. 
 41. See Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018) (announcing President 
Trump’s decision to “adjust the imports of steel articles by imposing a 25 percent ad valorem tariff 
on steel articles . . . imported from all countries except Canada and Mexico”); Proclamation No. 
7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,551 (Mar. 5, 2002) (announcing President George W. Bush’s decision to 
implement tariff “safeguard measures” with respect to certain types of steel products).  
 42. To be sure, in many cases this subsidy is inefficient in the sense that it costs those who 
pay it more than it benefits recipients. Studies bore out this inefficiency in the case of President 
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barriers, such as a quantitative restriction on imports), the government 
redirects private dollars to its preferred recipients—a regulatory 
subsidy.  
President Trump’s “national security” tariffs on steel and 
aluminum, imposed in 2018 and still in effect,43 illustrate how tariffs 
effectively use government power to redistribute wealth from one set of 
private parties to another. One estimate suggested that President 
Trump’s tariffs would increase the output of the U.S. steel and 
aluminum sectors by $9.8 billion and $0.8 billion, respectively.44 The 
same estimate, however, suggested that a variety of other industries, 
led by the vehicle and heavy manufacturing industries, would lose 
roughly $22 billion in output.45 Overall, the tariffs would therefore 
reduce output across all U.S. industries by $11.6 billion.46 Put 
differently, President Trump used tariffs to redistribute from 
downstream manufacturing industries to the steel and aluminum 
industries, at a net loss to the overall economy. 
B. Decoupling Market Access from Government Support  
for Domestic Industries and Labor 
Historically, Congress has used high trade barriers—mostly in 
the form of tariffs (i.e., taxes) on imported goods—to provide just this 
kind of indirect subsidy for favored industries and workers.47 In the first 
half of the nineteenth century, Henry Clay successfully pushed for 
tariffs as part of his “American System.”48 The protection provided by 
tariffs allowed infant industries in the industrializing northeast of the 
United States to develop without the threat of foreign competition,49 
while also providing revenue for the federal government to invest in 
 
Bush’s 2002 steel tariffs. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Time for a Grand Bargain in 
Steel?, INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Jan. 2002), https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/time-
grand-bargain-steel [https://perma.cc/RPV4-K8JJ] (estimating that every job saved by the Bush 
steel tariffs would cost $584,000).  
 43. See Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. at 11,625. 
 44. The Economic Impact of Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, FTI CONSULTING 2 (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.fticonsulting.com/~/media/Files/us-files/insights/articles/economic-impact-steel-
aluminum-tariffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF3M-HANJ]. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. See generally Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 
107 CALIF. L. REV. 583, 593 (2019) (listing “the protection of industry” and “encouragement of 
infant industry” as “central purposes” for tariffs in the twentieth century).  
 48. See MAURICE G. BAXTER, HENRY CLAY AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 26–28, 32 (1995) 
(describing the passage of an 1820s tariff bill as being “a definite endorsement of . . . [Henry Clay’s] 
proclaimed American System”).  
 49. F. W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (6th ed. 1914) (describing 
“protection to young industries”). 
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infrastructure connecting the eastern and western United States.50 
Similarly, in the late nineteenth century, the Republican Party pushed 
for tariffs as a way to ease the social dislocation caused by the industrial 
revolution.51 
In the wake of the Second World War, though, governments 
created the GATT, the WTO’s precursor, to discipline governments’ use 
of trade barriers, thereby limiting their usefulness to provide regulatory 
subsidies for the labor market.52 High trade barriers around the globe 
had fueled the tensions leading to the war, and leaders felt that putting 
limits on trade barriers—mostly tariffs—would help nations rebuild 
after the war and limit the chances of a third global conflict.53 And, as 
the general theory of trade liberalization predicts, they were right. 
Declines in tariffs led to a surge in global trade in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.54 The growth in international trade, in turn, lifted 
millions around the world out of poverty.55 
The GATT provided the basis for a series of multilateral 
negotiating “rounds” in which countries committed to lowering their 
tariffs on specific products.56 The initial GATT negotiations saw 
significant tariff reductions, led by what amounted to an average 35% 
tariff reduction by the United States.57 But GATT members achieved 
considerably less success over the course of the four rounds of 
negotiations that carried them through the end of the 1950s.58   
Consequently, at the beginning of the 1960s, GATT members 
were looking for an opportunity to greatly reduce global tariffs. The 
 
 50. See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY 157 
(2017) (discussing “federal spending on canals, roads, and other transportation improvements as 
a way of reducing the region’s economic isolation and attracting labor and capital from the East” 
to the Midwest).  
 51. James L. Huston, A Political Response to Industrialism: The Republican Embrace of 
Protectionist Labor Doctrines, 70 J. AM. HIST. 35, 36 (1983). 
 52. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194, 272–73 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 53. CHAD P. BOWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 11 (2009).  
 54. See Gabriel Felbermayr & Wilhelm Kohler, WTO Membership and the Extensive Margin 
of World Trade: New Evidence 2–3 (Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Working Paper No. 
304/2009, 2009), https://projekte.uni-hohenheim.de/RePEc/hoh/papers/304.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
U7JS-CXRE] (noting that the average annual growth rate of the volume of world exports was 6.2% 
between 1950 and 2005). 
 55. Press Release, World Trade Org., Free Trade Helps Reduce Poverty, Says New WTO 
Secretariat Study (June 13, 2000), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr181_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/36FU-HQD7]. 
 56. See David Grieg, The GATT and Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 59 AUSTRALIAN Q. 305, 
308 (1987) (providing a list of GATT negotiating rounds). 
 57. Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT in Historical Perspective, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 325 (1995).  
 58. Id. (“[T]he GATT achieved remarkably little in the 15 years after the Geneva Round.”).  
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United States led the way, with President Kennedy seeking 
extraordinary authority from Congress to cut tariffs if an international 
agreement could be reached. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (“TEA”) 
provided the president with just that authority. Congress authorized 
the president to negotiate unprecedented reductions in U.S. tariffs—up 
to 50% or more in certain circumstances—in exchange for reductions 
from other countries.59  
As economist Douglas Irwin put it, “The resulting Kennedy 
Round of trade negotiations during the 1960’s concluded with the most 
substantial tariff reductions of the postwar period.”60 The United States 
alone cut its nonagricultural tariffs from approximately 14% on average 
to under 10%.61 Moreover, the TEA laid the groundwork for the next 
two major rounds of multilateral GATT negotiations (the Tokyo and 
Uruguay rounds) that ultimately concluded with the creation of the 
WTO in 1995. The TEA thus represents a seminal moment in U.S. and 
global trade policy. 
Significantly, Congress authorized the president to make tariff 
reduction commitments that lasted indefinitely. The TEA required that 
the United States have the right to terminate any agreements 
negotiated pursuant to its mandate with due notice, but did not put an 
automatic expiration date on the tariff reductions.62 Likewise, as a 
matter of international law, the GATT makes tariff commitments 
indefinite in length, although it does allow nations to renegotiate their 
commitments under certain circumstances.63 Therefore, the trade 
liberalization commitments negotiated by the president would never 
require reauthorization by Congress, nor would the president have to 
take affirmative steps to extend them.  
President Kennedy (and ultimately President Johnson, whose 
Administration conducted the Kennedy Round negotiations) would 
have had a difficult time selling these tariff reductions, though, without 
 
 59. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 201(b), 76 Stat. 872 (codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 1821 (2012)). The Act actually allowed for even deeper cuts in certain circumstances, 
pursuant to an agreement with the European Economic Community. § 211, 76 Stat. at 873–74 
(repealed 1975). 
 60. Irwin, supra note 57, at 326. 
 61. Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT’s Starting Point: Tariff Levels Circa 1947 
24 tbl.6 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21782, 2015), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w21782.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W9X-T4ZV]. 
 62. § 255, 76 Stat. at 880 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1885 (2012)).  
 63. See GATT, supra note 52, art. II, 55 U.N.T.S. at 200–04 (committing states to providing 
tariff treatment no less favorable than that contained in their schedule of concessions); id. art. 
XXVIII, 55 U.N.T.S. at 276–78 (describing procedures for the modification of schedules). The 
renegotiation process, however, encourages states to offset withdrawn concessions with new 
concessions. If they do not do so, other states can withdraw concessions in response. Consequently, 
the renegotiation process itself seeks to make renegotiation unattractive.  
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some plan to help industries that would lose the protection from 
competition that came with higher tariffs. For substantial swathes of 
American production, the TEA and the resulting Kennedy Round tariff 
cuts amounted to a major reduction in the implicit subsidy trade 
protection provides.64 American negotiators understood this effect. 
Multiple studies conducted after the Kennedy Round suggested that 
U.S. negotiators agreed to smaller tariff cuts for industries that would 
have a more difficult time transitioning their labor force into other 
work.65   
Anticipating political pushback due to the removal of protection 
for sensitive industries, President Kennedy proposed that the TEA 
include the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, which would offer 
financial assistance to workers and firms who faced competition from a 
new flood of imports.66 With TAA, President Kennedy sought to 
decouple access to U.S. markets from government support for U.S. 
industries and workers that compete with imports. Prior to 1962, tariff 
rates had been the primary policy tool that affected both of these 
policies. High tariff rates provided support for import-competing 
industries by effectively limiting market access for cheaper imports—
that is, by raising the price of imported products that consumers might 
otherwise purchase. Lower tariffs allowed foreign producers to sell to 
domestic consumers at the expense of import-competing domestic 
producers, who might have to lower their prices to remain competitive.  
With the creation of TAA, access to U.S. markets—with the 
greater range of choices such market access offers domestic 
consumers—would continue to be influenced primarily by tariff rates. 
Support for import-competing U.S. industries, though, could be 
managed through TAA. The hope was that labor groups and import-
competing industries would support greater market access, since they 
now had a dedicated policy instrument—direct adjustment assistance 
from the federal government—to see to their needs. In other words, high 
tariffs, with their costs for domestic consumers, would therefore no 
 
 64. Alfred E. Eckes, Trading American Interests, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 135, 136 (1992): 
[B]y January 1972, when the Kennedy Round concessions were fully implemented, 
tariffs no longer sheltered high-wage American workers from low-paid labor abroad. 
American producers and workers now found themselves competing in a relatively open 
international economy at a time when other improvements in transportation and 
communications and the emergence of many new suppliers intensified competition. 
 65. See Malcolm D. Bale, United States Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-Run 
Labour Adjustment Costs: Further Evidence, 7 J. INT’L ECON. 145 (1977); John H. Cheh, United 
States Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-Run Labor Adjustment Costs, 4 J. INT’L ECON. 
323 (1974) (hypothesizing that interindustrial variations in tariff reductions reflect a government 
policy of minimizing labor adjustment problems resulting from tariff cuts). 
 66. §§ 301–361, 76 Stat. at 883–901 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).   
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longer be necessary in order to provide government support to import-
competing sectors of the economy. 
President Kennedy justified TAA explicitly in terms of 
substituting direct government support for the indirect support 
provided by tariffs. He argued that “[w]hen considerations of national 
policy make it desirable to avoid higher tariffs, those injured by that 
competition should not be required to bear the full brunt of the impact. 
Rather, the burden of economic adjustment should be borne in part by 
the Federal Government.”67 Just as President Kennedy had hoped, 
labor interests fell in line, supporting the TEA in exchange for the direct 
support offered by the adjustment assistance program. AFL-CIO 
President George Meany told the Senate Finance Committee that 
“there is no question whatever that adjustment assistance is essential 
to the success of trade expansion. And as we have said many times, it 
is indispensable to our support of the trade program as a whole.”68 
In decoupling market access from government support, 
President Kennedy followed what would become a consensus view 
within neoliberal trade policy: that indirect regulatory subsidies are an 
inefficient and politically unaccountable means of supporting the 
desired economic activity. Proponents of trade liberalization argued 
that trade policy should instead follow a two-step process.69 First, 
governments should negotiate international agreements aimed at 
reducing trade barriers.70 By eliminating trade barriers, international 
trade policy could maximize the total amount of wealth created through 
trade. To be sure, trade liberalization would result in dislocations 
within domestic economies. Some workers would lose their jobs; some 
businesses would close. But the economic growth from trade 
liberalization would create new jobs for those who lost their jobs and 
new businesses in those communities that initially saw economic 
retrenchment.71 The benefits of trade liberalization would, in other 
words, trickle down.  
In the event that the invisible hand of the market did not help 
those hurt by trade liberalization, the government could step in and 
provide assistance as a matter of domestic economic policy—the second 
 
 67. Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Trade Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 68, 76 (Jan. 25, 
1962).  
 68. Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 87th 
Cong. 241 (1962) (statement of George Meany, President, American Federation of Labor and Cong. 
of Industrial Organizations). 
 69. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 3 (describing the two-step model of trade policy).  
 70. Id.  
 71. Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, A Trade Policy for All, FOREIGN AFF. (June 26, 
2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-26/trade-policy-all [https://perma.cc/ 
YHN2-PK4C] (describing and critiquing this view of trade liberalization).  
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step.72 This contingent domestic assistance was thought to have several 
benefits. Most importantly, direct financial assistance would be more 
efficient than indirect assistance through trade policy. As Nobel Prize–
winning economist Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, the chief 
economist at the International Monetary Fund, put it:  
It is always preferable to deal with market failures as directly as possible . . . . Any 
proposed trade policy should always be compared with a purely domestic policy aimed at 
correcting the same problem. If the domestic policy appears too costly or has undesirable 
side effects, the trade policy is almost surely even less desirable . . . .73   
Beyond the efficiency gains, scholars have also argued that 
direct subsidies are more transparent and hence more politically 
accountable than indirect subsidies.74 Both tax appropriations and the 
direct receipt of government funds by a private enterprise are, in 
theory, visible to the public and therefore subject to greater oversight.75 
By contrast, “[f]iscal or regulatory schemes according privileges to a 
particular sector can transfer resources in hidden ways,” thereby 
evading public oversight.76   
This theory of trickle-down trade liberalization, and its 
codification in the TEA and TAA, provided the intellectual justification 
for taking political fights over government support for import-
competing interests out of debates about market access. Prior to 1962, 
negotiations about market access and subsidies for import-competing 
labor and industry occurred on a single policy dimension—how high 
should tariffs be? Although further reductions in trade barriers 
continue to have both of these elements,77 after 1962 the same two 
 
 72. Shaffer, supra note 14, at 3.  
 73. KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 14, at 216. Similar arguments have been made in a 
range of issue areas. See e.g., Harry S. Gerla, Swimming Against the Deregulatory Tide: 
Maintaining Fixed Prices in Public Offerings of Securities Through the NASD Antidiscounting 
Rules, 36 VAND. L. REV. 9, 28–29 (1983) (“[U]nlike a direct subsidy, a cross-subsidy is insulated 
from the increased scrutiny and give and take of the political process.”); Alfred E. Kahn, The Road 
to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 157 (1984) (arguing that price 
controls, a common form of regulatory subsidy, create “an unrealistic, inequitable and inefficient 
regime in which certain groups of consumers subsidize others in ways unrelated to rational social 
goals”). 
 74. Arthur Dunkel & Frieder Roessler, The Ranking of Trade Policy Instruments Under the 
GATT Legal System, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 33, at 224, 227 (“In the case of a 
production subsidy in the form of direct budgetary transfers, the costs of protection are more 
apparent than in the case of import controls.”).  
 75. Id. at 227 (“[I]n order to subsidize, taxes need to be raised, which is an unpopular 
governmental activity.”).  
 76. Id.  
 77. Of course, decoupling market access from government support reduced, but did not 
remove, the pressure to use trade barriers as a form of government support. The United States, 
for instance, was slow to reduce trade barriers for textiles, out of fear that foreign competition 
would wipe out U.S. textile manufacturing. Developed countries throughout the world have 
maintained significant tariff and non-tariff barriers on agricultural products. See M. Ataman 
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issues occurred on two policy dimensions: (1) how high should tariffs 
be? and (2) how much funding should be available for adjustment 
assistance, for how long, and under what conditions? Creating two 
policy choices where only one had existed previously undermined the 
negotiating position of import-competing interests. Policymakers and 
pundits with very different views about government support could 
agree to pursue trade liberalization because of the overall wealth it 
created. Political fights about how to distribute that wealth could occur 
over a different policy instrument. As discussed below, the result was 
that trade liberalization continued apace, while adjustment assistance 
stagnated.  
C. Adjustment Assistance’s Purgatory 
Congress revisited trade’s deregulatory bargain in 1974. In so 
doing, it established a pattern that persists to this day. In each 
successive negotiation over trade liberalization, Congress has 
reauthorized TAA only for a limited amount of time and for a limited 
budget. As a consequence, failure to reauthorize the program would 
 
Aksoy, Global Agriculture Trade Policies, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 86, 86–88 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin eds., 2005) (outlining the evolution of 
agricultural subsidies in developing countries); Bernard Hoekman et al., Eliminating Excessive 
Tariffs on Exports of Least Developed Countries, 16 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 1, 3–4 (2002) (noting 
that peak tariffs in developed countries tend to be on agricultural and textile products). These 
subsidies reflect the judgment of governments that national agricultural practices—and more 
broadly, national cultures associated with food—are worth supporting, even if doing so results in 
higher food prices in developed countries. Aksoy, supra. 
 Indeed, the practice of using trade barriers to effectively subsidize favored industries continues 
today. The Trump Administration has pursued the revival of tariffs in a range of sectors and has 
done so explicitly on the grounds that it wishes to support those sectors of the American economy. 
Beyond the steel tariffs referenced above, the Trump Administration has imposed tariffs on solar 
panels, washing machines, aluminum, a wide range of products from China, and is considering 
additional tariffs on autos and auto parts. David Lawder & David Shepardson, White House to 
Consider Commerce Department Auto Tariff Recommendations: Officials, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-autos/white-house-to-consider-commerce-
department-auto-tariff-recommendations-officials-idUSKCN1NH2JP [https://perma.cc/K7F4-
PUY7]; Ka Zeng, Trump’s Tariffs on Chinese Products Won’t Work. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Mar. 
20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/20/trumps-tariffs-on-
chinese-products-wont-work-heres-why/ [https://perma.cc/TE5A-N2X2]. While economists 
generally agree that these tariffs impose a net cost on the U.S. economy, they also clearly provide 
a regulatory subsidy to the protected industries. In fact, part of the appeal of creating regulatory 
subsidies through trade policy is that trade policy is one of the few tools the president has to dole 
out subsidies unilaterally. Ordinarily, Congress must appropriate funding for subsidies. But 
because Congress has delegated to the president the power to raise tariffs, he can impose such 
tariffs as a way to create regulatory subsidies without first needing Congress’s permission. See 
Timothy Meyer, Trade, Redistribution, and the Imperial Presidency, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 
16 (2019) (noting that Congress has delegated almost total control over tariff rates to the president, 
and presidential administrations search for policies that can be implemented without 
Congressional control).   
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result in its demise. By contrast, a failure to reach agreement on either 
the negotiating authority for—or the approval of—a new trade 
agreement would not result in a rollback of trade liberalization 
commitments. Rather, it would simply curtail further trade 
liberalization.  
As a consequence, negotiations over trade liberalization and 
TAA have occurred on different scales since trade liberalization and 
adjustment assistance were decoupled in the 1960s. Trade 
liberalization’s proponents only need to renegotiate the amount of trade 
adjustment assistance to secure marginal increases in trade 
liberalization. TAA’s proponents, however, need to renegotiate to secure 
any authority for trade adjustment assistance to continue.  
1. Trade Liberalization After the 1960s 
The beginning of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations 
at the GATT, the Tokyo Round, gave Congress reason to take up trade 
policy again. In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress authorized the 
president to enter into further tariff-reducing agreements. The Trade 
Act was also the first statute to authorize the president to negotiate 
reductions in nontariff barriers—measures other than tariffs (often 
regulations) that impede imports and exports.78 The Trade Act also 
established “fast-track” procedures, whereby Congress would consider 
implementing legislation for any resulting agreements in an expedited 
process.79 Fast-track procedures, which essentially guarantee trade 
agreements an up-or-down vote in both houses of Congress without 
possibility of amendment, replaced the ordinary legislative process, 
which permits members of Congress to use procedural roadblocks to 
slow down or block the adoption of legislation.80  
By establishing fast-track procedures, the 1974 Trade Act paved 
the way for the modern era of expansive trade liberalization.81 Prior to 
the Trade Act, if the president negotiated an agreement reducing 
nontariff barriers, Congress would have had to approve implementing 
legislation through the ordinary legislative process.82 At the end of the 
Kennedy Round, Congress failed to implement such an agreement 
 
 78. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 102, 88 Stat. 1978, 1982–84 (1975) (codified 
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (2012)).  
 79. §§ 102, 151, 88 Stat. at 1982–84, 2001–04 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 
(2012)). 
 80. § 151, 88 Stat. at 2001–04 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2191). 
 81. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47.  
 82. See IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 
(TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 2–4 (2015) (describing the historical roles of 
Congress and the president in establishing foreign trade policy).  
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through this ordinary process.83 This failure slowed the pace of trade 
liberalization and ultimately led Congress in 1974 to use fast track to 
circumscribe its review of trade agreements in order to facilitate greater 
trade liberalization—a procedure Congress has regularly included in its 
authorizations for trade negotiations since.84 
Indeed, since the 1974 Act, the president has negotiated and 
Congress has approved over a dozen trade agreements covering 
virtually all of U.S. international trade. In 1979, Congress approved the 
agreements coming out of the GATT’s Tokyo Round negotiations.85 
Even more consequentially, in 1994 Congress approved the Marrakesh 
Agreement, which created the WTO and greatly expanded the set of 
multilateral trade obligations, most notably by including services and 
intellectual property.86 The United States has also entered into fifteen 
different free trade agreements with twenty different countries.87 Even 
President Trump, no fan of trade liberalization, has gotten in on the 
game, pursuing new trade agreements with Japan and the European 
Union.88 
2. Adjustment Assistance After the 1960s 
At the same time it made trade liberalization easier, Congress 
revisited TAA. First, Congress loosened the eligibility criteria and 
 
 83. Id. at 4. 
 84. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47.  
 85. FERGUSSON, supra note 82, at 6.  
 86. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 87. See Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7X3F-PSS9] 
(listing U.S. trade agreements). The United States currently has only fourteen agreements in force, 
as the United States–Canada Free Trade Agreement was suspended when NAFTA entered into 
force. The United States also negotiated a major twelve-nation trade agreement, known as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, under President Obama. President Trump, however, took the United 
States out of the pact. Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s 
Signature Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us 
/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html [https://perma.cc/P4LF-YBL2].  
 88. Bob Bryan, Trump is Launching Negotiations with Japan to Create a New Trade 
Agreement, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2018, 4:26 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-us-
japan-trade-deal-negotiations-2018-9 [https://perma.cc/57KQ-ESUC]; David Shepardson, Trump 
Administration Says to Open Trade Talks with EU, UK, Japan, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2018, 2:16 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-talks/trump-administration-says-to-open-trade-
talks-with-eu-uk-japan-idUSKCN1MQ2P2 [https://perma.cc/6NFY-5LQ3]. The Trump 
Administration has also renegotiated NAFTA and KORUS, although the differences between the 
new and old versions of these agreements are modest. Josh Zumbrun, Bob Davis, & Kwanwoo Jun, 
U.S. Wins ‘Modest’ Trade Concessions from South Korea, WALL ST. J. (March 26, 2018, 7:35 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trade-deal-eases-way-for-u-s-south-korea-to-collaborate-on-north-
1522058350 [https://perma.cc/GFV2-37F5].  
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expanded benefits.89 Congress had originally limited funding to job 
retraining and some income support while retraining was underway.90 
Eligibility under the TEA was also narrow, with applicants having to 
demonstrate that they had lost their jobs directly because of 
competition with imports.91 Indeed, although the program was created 
in 1962, the first successful application for benefits under TAA was not 
accepted until 1969.92 In effect, Congress had created a program that 
promised support but in practice entailed a limited financial 
commitment at best. 
Second, Congress authorized the program for only eight years.93 
This time-limited reauthorization broke the temporal link between TAA 
and U.S. trade agreements. The 1962 TEA had authorized TAA 
indefinitely,94 just as it had authorized indefinite trade liberalization 
commitments. Beginning in 1974, however, Congress established a 
situation in which it need not take any action to extend the United 
States’ trade liberalization commitments, but it must affirmatively act 
to renew TAA.  
Since 1974, a number of statutes have extended and 
reauthorized TAA, albeit in somewhat different forms and never again 
for a period longer than six years.95 Congress extended TAA in 1974, 
1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2015.96 By and large, these dates reflect moments 
 
 89. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 8. 
 90. See C. Michael Aho & Thomas O. Bayard, Costs and Benefits of Trade Adjustment 
Assistance, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 153 (Robert E. 
Baldwin & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1984) (describing that the first generation of TAA provided 
compensation and adjustment services to trade-displaced workers, and the program was later 
liberalized and expanded beyond these narrow services). 
 91. See Ethan Kapstein, Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Trade Adjustment 
Assistance, 137 INT’L LABOUR REV. 501, 508 (1998) (“[T]he criteria used to determine worker 
eligibility for TAA required evidence that import levels in the worker’s industry had increased ‘in 
major part’ because of the TEA, and that this increase was the ‘major cause’ of injury to the workers 
in the specific firms in the industry.”). 
 92. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 8. 
 93. Id. at 16.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (listing the authorization periods for TAA).  
 96. For a complete list prior to 2013, see HORNBECK, supra note 24, at app. See also Trade 
Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (to be 
codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 112-40, 125 Stat. 401 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of U.S.C.); Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); North 
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3473 (2012)); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); 
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at which the president sought authority to negotiate new trade 
agreements or sought congressional approval of agreements he had 
already negotiated.97 At these moments, politics relinked trade 
liberalization and adjustment assistance. But in the years after the 
1974 Trade Act, the ability to rely only on the weak and episodic 
political linkage worked to the significant detriment of those favoring 
adjustment assistance policies.  
Indeed, as Table 1 makes clear, the length of time for which 
Congress authorizes TAA depends significantly on whether trade 
liberalization—in the form of fast-track authority or approval of new 
trade agreements—is under consideration. With one exception (a six-
year reauthorization in 1986), Congress has never reauthorized TAA 
for longer than twenty-seven months if TAA has not been paired with a 
bill authorizing further trade liberalization. By contrast, when TAA and 
trade liberalization are considered together, Congress has only once 
reauthorized TAA for less than five years (thirty-four months in 2011). 
 
TABLE 1: REAUTHORIZING TAA WITH AND WITHOUT  
TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
 




Negotiating Authority or 
Trade Agreement 
Approved? 
1962 Trade Expansion Act, P.L. No. 87-
794 
Indefinite Kennedy Round of GATT 
negotiations 
1974 Trade Act of 1974, P.L. No. 93-618 8 years Tokyo Round of GATT 
negotiations 
1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1981, P.L. No. 97-35 
1 year No 
1983 An Act to Amend the 
International Coffee Agreement 
Act, P.L. No. 98-120 
2 years No 
1984 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. 
No. 98-369 
10 weeks No 
1985 Emergency Extension Act of 1985, 
P.L. No. 99-107 
5 weeks No 
Lapses December 19, 1985 to March 1986 
 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Trade 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 
(2012)); see Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872. 
 97. For instance, in 1993 and 2009, legislation was tied to the approval of NAFTA and several 
Bush-era trade agreements, respectively. The 1988 legislation laid the groundwork for the 
Uruguay Round negotiations at the GATT (which culminated in the creation of the WTO), while 
legislation in 2002 and 2015 set the stage for the Bush-era trade negotiations and the Obama 
Administration’s push to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership, respectively. See Table 1;  supra 
note 96. 
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1986 Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985, P.L. 
No. 99-272 
6 years No 
1988 Omnibus Trade & 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 
No. 100-418 
2 years Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations & NAFTA 
negotiations 
1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993, P.L. No. 103-66 
5 years NAFTA approval 
1998 District of Columbia 
Appropriations 
9 months No 
1999 Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 2000, P.L. No. 106-113 
27 months No 
Lapses September 30, 2001 to August 6, 2002 
2002 Trade Act of 2002, P.L.  
No. 107-210 
5 years Negotiating authority for 
Bush-era trade agreements98 
2007 TAA Extension Act, P.L.  
No. 110-89 
3 months No 
Lapses December 31, 2007 to February 17, 2009 
2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 2008, P.L. No. 110-161 
1 year No 
2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster 
Assistance, and Continuing 
Appropriations Act of 2009, P.L. 
No. 110-329 
2 months No 
2009 American Recovery & 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. 
No. 111-5 
2 years   No99 
2010 Omnibus Trade Act of 2010, P.L. 
No. 111-344 
13 months No 
2011 TAA Extension Act of 2011, P.L. 
No. 112-40 
34 months Done in connection with 
legislation implementing FTAs 
with Colombia, Panama, and 
South Korea100 
2015 TAA Reauthorization Act of 2015, 
P.L. No. 114-27 
6 years Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations, NAFTA 2.0101 
 
 
98. The Bush Administration negotiated eleven agreements under this authority, primarily 
with countries that supported the Administration’s war on terror. See Free Trade Agreements, 
supra note 87 (listing U.S. trade agreements).  
99. The 2009 reauthorization of TAA was done as part of the larger economic stimulus 
package designed to address the Great Recession. See BENJAMIN COLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R44153, TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS AND THE TAA REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 
2015, at 12 (2018) (noting that the TAA was reauthorized in 2009 and expanded to spur economic 
activity during a time of increased unemployment); HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 12. 
100. COLLINS, supra note 99, at 13. 
101. At the time, many thought this authority would be used to negotiate a free trade 
agreement with Europe, known as the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Doug 
Palmer, US Trade Vote Puts TTIP on Faster Track, POLITICO (June 30, 2015), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/us-trade-vote-ttip-obama/ [https://perma.cc/FQ5Z-J533]. Instead, 
the Trump Administration used it to negotiate its revision to NAFTA, the United States–Mexico–
Canada Agreement (“NAFTA 2.0” or “USMCA”). Tori Whiting & Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, Next 
Steps for the USMCA: Congress Should Have Its Say to Ensure Free Trade, HERITAGE FOUND. 
(June 18, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/next-steps-the-usmca-congress-should-
have-its-say-ensure-free-trade [https://perma.cc/824N-CJ7T].  
Meyer_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:22 AM 
2020] MISALIGNED LAWMAKING 177 
The pressure on adjustment assistance policies became most 
clear at the end of the Tokyo Round of negotiations in 1979. In 
implementing the outcome of the negotiations, Congress tried to pass 
legislation extending and expanding TAA. However, in part because the 
legislation was separate from the legislation approving the Tokyo 
Round outcomes, and in part due to concerns about budget priorities, 
the legislation died in the Senate.102  
With TAA up for reauthorization in 1982, the Reagan 
Administration agreed to extend it for only two years in exchange for 
cuts in benefits and an overall reduction of $2.6 billion in the program’s 
budget.103 When the time for reauthorization rolled around in 1983, the 
Reagan Administration proposed simply eliminating the program.104 
Instead, Congress extended the program until 1985, while cutting 
benefits and funding once again.105 In 1985, TAA lapsed completely for 
a period of three months before being reauthorized through the end of 
the 1991 fiscal year.106 This reprieve, too, came with cuts; it eliminated 
loans, loan guarantees, and other financial benefits for firms suffering 
from import competition.107 This reluctance to support TAA came, not 
surprisingly, during a period of time in which the Reagan 
Administration had few international trade priorities. With no 
leverage, TAA proponents were unable to prevent cuts to adjustment 
assistance. 
The tide turned somewhat in TAA’s favor when it came time for 
Congress to once again consider big new trade agreements: NAFTA and 
the WTO agreements. Legislative efforts to approve these two new 
trade packages prompted reauthorization and expansion of TAA. In 
1993, Congress reauthorized regular TAA and, in legislation passed in 
December 1993, created a TAA program specifically for those adversely 
affected by NAFTA.108 In 1999, Congress extended these programs until 
2001.109  
From September 2001 until August 2002, Congress let TAA 
lapse again.110 The program was only reauthorized when President 
George W. Bush sought trade promotion authority to negotiate new free 
 
 102. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 9. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, §§ 501–
507, 107 Stat. 2057, 2149–54 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).  
 109. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 702(b), 113 Stat. 1501, 
1501A-319 (1999) (repealed 2002).  
 110. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 16. 
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trade agreements, such as the Central American free trade agreement 
(“CAFTA”) and KORUS.111 The 2002 legislation represented perhaps 
the first truly major extension of TAA in decades, creating a subsidized 
health insurance program for dislocated workers, expanded eligibility 
for downstream workers, and a new program for farm workers.112 
Since then, however, Congress has chipped away at TAA. A 
wholesale reauthorization failed to pass in 2007, and the program again 
lapsed, receiving only temporary funding to continue into 2009.113 By 
tying approval of trade agreements with Korea, Panama, and Columbia 
to TAA’s fate, Congress managed to extend TAA to 2012, and in 2011 
extended it until 2013.114 In 2015, Congress finally extended the 
program until the end of fiscal year 2021.115 That six-year extension—
linked to the Obama Administration’s efforts to secure approval for the 
TPP—marked the longest lease on life TAA had been given since 
1986.116 But like much of the TAA legislation during the Obama 
Administration, it came with cuts to funding that reduced the size and 
scope of the program.117 
D. The Costs of Decoupling 
The historical record regarding TAA is thus clear. President 
Kennedy introduced TAA explicitly to replace indirect subsidies 
provided by high trade barriers with direct subsidies.118 The deal should 
have been a win for everyone. The overall economy would benefit from 
trade liberalization, while direct subsidies would make workers and 
import-competing firms whole.  
Instead, Congress has repeatedly cut TAA. Consequently, 
workers and import-competing industries have not gotten what they 
were promised. The shift from regulatory subsidies to direct subsidies 
foreshadowed a subsequent decline in the direct subsidies. Moreover, 
that decline has contributed to the erosion of the manufacturing base 
 
 111. See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 111, 116 Stat. 933, 936 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
 112. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 10–11.  
 113. Id. at 11–12.  
 114. Id. at 12–13.  
 115. Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, § 403, 129 
Stat. 362, 374. 
 116. Congress also failed to pass TAA authorization as part of the 2015 Omnibus Trade 
Accountability and Priorities Act. Instead, Congress separated trade-negotiating authority and 
TAA authorization into separate bills. However, President Obama successfully insisted on signing 
them together. See Obama Signs 2 Trade Bills into Law, VOA NEWS (June 29, 2015, 6:38 PM), 
https://www.voanews.com/usa/obama-signs-2-trade-bills-law [https://perma.cc/4K5V-GQ3M]. 
 117. See § 403, 129 Stat. at 374. 
 118. See discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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in many states and communities, the loss of middle-class jobs, and 
economic insecurity that threatens the stability of an international 
trading system that has delivered economic growth and development to 
millions around the world, including within the United States.  
More specifically, TAA has failed to stop or significantly smooth 
out the disruptions from the well-documented decline of U.S. 
manufacturing, especially in the midwestern United States. That 
decline has put downward pressure on employment and wages, and it 
has created fears about long-term economic security.119 The American 
steel sector again provides a case in point. Data from the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics shows that from 2000 to 2016, U.S. steel jobs 
declined by 35%, a loss of 48,000 jobs.120 Similar trends can be found in 
data from the group Public Citizen, which tracks the number of net 
manufacturing jobs lost in each state since the United States joined 
NAFTA and the WTO, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.121 
For instance, according to Public Citizen, Pennsylvania has lost 308,676 
jobs (a 35.4% decline in the sector) and Ohio has lost 276,474 
manufacturing jobs (a 28.5% decline in the sector).122  
While other causes besides trade liberalization, such as 
automation, have contributed to these job losses, there is no longer any 
 
 119. See David B. Muhlhausen & James Sherk, Trade Adjustment Assistance: Let the 
Ineffective and Wasteful “Job-Training” Program Expire, HERITAGE FOUND. 1, 2–4 (Dec. 4, 2014), 
https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/trade-adjustment-assistance-let-the-ineffective-
and-wasteful-job-training [https://perma.cc/BA6U-7EKM] (arguing that TAA actually lowers the 
future earnings of its participants); Mark Muro & Joseph Parilla, Maladjusted: It’s Time to 
Reimagine Economic ‘Adjustment’ Programs, BROOKINGS (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/01/10/maladjusted-its-time-to-reimagine-
economic-adjustment-programs/ [https://perma.cc/2V2H-CVF6] (discussing the need for changes 
to U.S. economic adjustment programs, especially in light of today’s pervasive labor market 
disruptions). 
 120. Joseph S. Pete, U.S. Steel Industry Has Lost 48,000 Jobs Since 2000, NORTHWEST IND. 
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.nwitimes.com/business/steel/u-s-steel-industry-has-lost-jobs-
since/article_4ffd704a-1cdc-5eb9-82eb-0b858a369877.html [https://perma.cc/6DS2-GM3P]. 
 121. Trade-Related Job Losses by State, PUB. CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/our-
work/globalization-and-trade/trade-related-job-loss-state (last visited Nov. 1, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/3KK2-CZNM].   
 122. Pennsylvania Job Loss During the NAFTA-WTO Period, PUB. CITIZEN, 
https://www.citizen.org/article/pennsylvania-job-loss-during-the-nafta-wto-period/ (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2019) [https://perma.cc/73HC-YAW5]; Ohio Job Loss During the NAFTA-WTO Period, 
PUB. CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/article/ohio-job-loss-during-the-nafta-wto-period/ (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2019) [https://perma.cc/WDG2-XL9N]. Although these data show a correlation 
between trade liberalization and the decline of manufacturing jobs, they say nothing about the 
overall effects of trade, do not indicate that all of the job losses were caused by trade, and do not 
say anything about the effects of trade on those who previously held the eliminated positions. 
Many such people will have gained employment in nonmanufacturing jobs, some of which were 
created by trade.  
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doubt that trade liberalization itself has played a major role.123 And 
while economists argued that labor markets would adjust to absorb 
unemployed workers into new jobs created by a more efficient 
economy,124 recent studies have found that the local effects of job losses 
from free trade agreements have not been offset by newly created jobs, 
which are often located far from the communities in which jobs are 
lost.125 While accepting the substantial benefits of trade to the nation 
as a whole, these studies have focused on the negative impact of 
reducing trade barriers on goods from new U.S. trading partners, 
especially China, on local labor markets in the United States.126 Most 
importantly, David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson have shown 
that communities that lost jobs after China joined the WTO in 2001 had 
still not recovered a decade later—a blow to the claim that the benefits 
of trade liberalization trickle down in a way that offsets trade 
liberalization’s costs.127  
Given the stakes for the stability of the international trading 
system, the United States’ failure to make good on TAA’s promise to 
workers is odd. Why has the federal government maintained its 
 
 123. These job losses may seem like a drop in the bucket of the entire U.S. economy, which 
loses (or “churns”) about 4 million jobs a year. See Hufbauer, Cimino & Moran, supra note 36, at 
5. Indeed, one of the great benefits of trade liberalization is that it can create many more new jobs 
through the more efficient allocation of resources. See, e.g., Miriam Sapiro, Why Trade Matters, 
BROOKINGS (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Trade-Global-
Views_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y5G-7Y5R] (discussing the economic rationales for an 
ambitious trade policy, including the creation of many new jobs). But to those workers who lose 
their jobs and struggle to find comparable work, the loss of a secure paycheck is devastating. See 
Farah Stockman, Becoming a Steelworker Liberated Her. Then Her Job Moved to Mexico., N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/14/us/union-jobs-mexico-rexnord.html 
[https://perma.cc/P5D5-QV38] (describing the effects of losing steel jobs on individuals in the 
midwestern United States). 
 124. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Opinion, Technology, Not Globalisation, Drives Wages Down, 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2007), https://www.ft.com/content/f8738fba-9b53-11db-aa70-0000779e2340 
[https://perma.cc/28GH-UYCD] (“[E]mpirical studies . . . .show that the adverse effect of trade on 
wages is not substantial.”); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech Before the Greater 
Omaha Chamber of Commerce: The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being (Feb. 6, 2007), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070206a.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
2DDP-N8FL] (“Because labor markets are adaptable, outsourcing abroad does not ultimately 
affect aggregate employment, but it may affect the distribution of wages . . . .”). 
 125. David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock: Learning from 
Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 205, 205 (2016):  
Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial 
adjustment costs and distributional consequences. These impacts are most visible in 
the local labor markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are 
concentrated. Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and 
labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates 
remaining elevated . . . . 
 126. Id. at 221–34. 
 127. Id. at 224. 
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commitment to trade liberalization but not to TAA, the other half of the 
bargain struck on trade policy? 
II. MISALIGNMENT IN TRADE LAWMAKING 
Lawmaking is an iterative process. Lawmakers often revisit 
prior laws in order to update them in light of new information or to 
renegotiate the distribution of costs and benefits. Indeed, lawmakers 
establish ex ante the terms under which renegotiation occurs. 
Lawmakers might, for instance, include a sunset provision in a law. 
Sunset provisions require lawmakers to reenact—and hence give them 
an opportunity to renegotiate—a law.128 Trouble can occur, however, 
when different parts of a legislative bargain are subject to different 
methods of renegotiation and implementation. In these situations, 
beneficiaries of the policy that is more frequently subject to 
renegotiation or costlier implementation will see their gains erode over 
time. Worse, these chronic losers may try to bring down both planks of 
the initial legislative bargain. 
In this Part, I set out the descriptive Misalignment Thesis—the 
theory of misaligned renegotiation and how it ultimately can lead to the 
collapse of the entire trading system. Section I.A defines misaligned 
lawmaking and explains how it operates in trade policy. Section II.B 
discusses the welfare effects of misaligned lawmaking.  
A. The Theory  
The descriptive Misalignment Thesis holds that when a 
legislative bargain is struck over two or more interdependent policies, 
the policy or policies subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation 
and implementation will be disfavored in the long run.129 The intuition 
is straightforward. When two policies are interrelated, supporters of 
both policies can strike a legislative bargain in which each gets the 
policy outcome it desires. Absent such mutual support, the bargain 
would not pass. Misalignment occurs when one of these policies is 
 
 128. See, e.g., Dan R. Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 401, 
401 (1978) (describing sunset legislation).  
 129. Public law scholars have long been worried about entrenching policies against democratic 
change. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset 
Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 (2006) (discussing the failure of sunset provisions 
to dislodge entrenched interest groups); Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political 
Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400 (2015) (demonstrating the ways in which 
political actors entrench their policies through functional means). Misalignment raises a similar, 
but distinct, concern. Misaligned lawmaking focuses on the relative costs of changing a policy and 
the impacts of those relative differences, rather than the absolute costs of changing a single policy.  
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subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation. Because the policy 
under renegotiation only passed as part of a package, renegotiating it 
without the other elements of the package leads to cuts in the policy. 
Proponents simply do not have the leverage in the subsequent 
negotiation that they had in the initial negotiation. Differences in the 
costs of implementation have a similar effect. If implementing one 
policy is substantially easier, changes to the policy can be made as part 
of the implementation process, obviating the need for a formal 
renegotiation.  
Misaligned lawmaking occurs when three conditions are 
satisfied: (1) interdependence, (2) decoupling, and (3) an absence of a 
credible commitment in the initial legislative bargain to renegotiate the 
two interdependent policies together. I explain these three conditions 
below.  
1. Interdependence 
By interdependence, I mean that a policy addressing one 
problem will have consequences that create demand for a policy 
response to a separate problem.130 Trade liberalization and trade 
adjustment assistance are one example. Trade liberalization, a policy of 
reducing barriers to imports, exposes some domestic industries to 
foreign competition, creating job losses. Those job losses, or their 
prospect, spur demand for a policy response.131 Prior to 1962, that policy 
response primarily took the form of higher trade barriers for swaths of 
the U.S. economy, i.e., it took the form of resisting trade liberalization. 
After 1962, though, the primary policy response has been trade 
adjustment assistance.132  
Other examples of interdependence abound. Deregulation of 
transportation markets, like airlines and railroads, causes carriers to 
abandon unprofitable routes.133 The absence of travel options in remote 
 
 130. This idea is somewhat similar to the idea of a regulatory externality, although it lacks 
the geographic or cross-border feature often ascribed to that term. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter & 
Francesco Parisi, The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of 
Regulatory Competition, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 309, 316 (2005) (discussing the positive 
externalities of antitrust regulation).  
 131. See supra Sections I.A–I.B (discussing the costs and benefits of trade liberalization and 
noting congressional responses to mitigate those costs). 
 132. Although political resistance to further trade liberalization has continued, it has largely 
been unsuccessful, as evidenced by the fact that the United States has a trade-weighted average 
tariff of only 2% on industrial goods. See Industrial Tariffs, supra note 30. 
 133. Cf. Andrew R. Goetz & Timothy M. Vowles, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: 30 Years of 
U.S. Airline Deregulation, 17 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 251, 257 (2009) (“In general, service and fares 
in shorter-distance and less-traveled city-pair markets . . . have not been as good as those in 
longer-distance and heavily-trafficked markets.”); Phillip Longman & Lina Khan, Terminal 
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parts of the country, in turn, creates pressure for a regulatory response 
to provide such options.134 Regulatory approval of a new mine or oil 
drilling project may create demand for environmental regulation.135 
This kind of interdependence is different from merely including 
two policies within the same piece of legislation. Any two policies can 
be included in the same bill or be subject to vote-trading. During his 
second term, for instance, President Obama sought negotiation 
authority (also known as trade promotion authority) to conclude 
negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership.136 Such authority would 
allow him to submit the agreement to an up-or-down vote in Congress, 
rather than subjecting it to amendment.137 Legislation granting 
President Obama trade promotion authority, however, failed in the 
House of Representatives.138 To pass the legislation, the House attached 
trade promotion authority to an unrelated bill on police officers’ and 
firefighters’ retirement plans.139 Democrats opposed to granting 
President Obama trade promotion authority accused Republicans of 
linking the two measures because it would look bad for Democrats to 
vote down a bill supporting police officers and firemen.140  
 
Sickness: How a Thirty-Year-Old Policy of Deregulation is Slowly Killing America’s Airline System, 
WASH. MONTHLY (Mar.–Apr. 2012), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril-
2012/terminal-sickness/ [https://perma.cc/B3HR-XPMC] (noting that “over the last five years, 
service to medium-airports fell by 18 percent”). 
 134. For example, in response to the Airline Deregulation Act, Congress established the 
Essential Air Service program to ensure that smaller communities would retain access to the 
National Air Transportation System. Essential Air Service, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., 
https://www.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-policy/small-community-rural-air-
service/essential-air-service (last updated Nov. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3FB3-XRFB] (“The 
Essential Air Service (EAS) program was put into place to guarantee that small communities that 
were served by certificated air carriers before airline deregulation maintain a minimal level of 
scheduled air service.”). 
 135. See James Conca, Is Fracking for Gas as Dirty as Coal?, FORBES (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/05/05/is-fracking-for-gas-dirty-enough-for-a-coal-
resurgence/#21b2e8664727 [https://perma.cc/8LFH-M7PN] (discussing how fracking for natural 
gas resulted in a growing antifracking movement). 
 136. See Doug Palmer, Obama Speaks out on Trade, POLITICO (Sept. 19, 2013, 2:29 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/obama-trade-promotion-authority-097073 
[https://perma.cc/NE4E-GQMP] (describing Obama’s efforts to pass trade promotion authority).  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Teamsters Denounce Hijacking of Firefighter Retirement Bill to Pass Fast Track in House, 
TEAMSTERS (June 18, 2015), https://teamster.org/news/2015/06/teamsters-denounce-hijacking-
firefighter-retirement-bill-pass-fast-track-house [https://perma.cc/H7WY-BTSM] (discussing how 
the House of Representatives attached trade promotion authority to “the Defending Public Safety 
Employees’ Retirement Act, a widely-supported bill that enables federal firefighters to access their 
retirement savings once they reach retirement age”). 
 140. 161 CONG. REC. H4507-02 (daily ed. June 18, 2015) (statement of Rep. Bill Pascrell) 
(“Today, this bill to provide tax fairness for our law enforcement officers has been twisted and 
diminished to a convenient vehicle to ram through fast track for a deeply flawed bill.”); see 161 
CONG. REC. H4497-03 (daily ed. June 18, 2015) (statement of Rep. Donna Edwards) (saying that 
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This kind of linkage is happenstance. It occurs only because two 
issues happen to be before Congress at the same time and therefore 
provide a basis for bargaining. But because the two issues are otherwise 
unrelated, they are unlikely to be linked again in the future. Nothing 
about supporting retirement plans for police officers and firefighters 
will create a demand for a new trade agreement or for trade adjustment 
policies.  
Interdependent issues, by contrast, will arise together precisely 
because changing policy on one issue creates costs within another issue 
space. Those costs create pressure for policies to address both issues 
simultaneously. Those responses may be linked in legislation or not. 
The key idea, though, is that the issues are interlocking in a way that 
creates a demand for negotiation across the two issues. 
2. Decoupling 
By decoupling, I mean the phenomenon of taking a single policy 
instrument that affects two interdependent policy goals and creating a 
second policy instrument to deal with one of those goals. President 
Kennedy, for example, decoupled trade liberalization and market access 
from labor market support and adjustment assistance by proposing the 
TAA program.141 As discussed in Part I, before TAA, trade barriers, 
most notably tariffs, were a single policy instrument governing two 
issues. They limited market access, and they also provided labor market 
support for import-competing sectors of the economy. After TAA, the 
government could use trade barriers primarily to regulate market 
access, while TAA would separately address the labor implications of 
trade policy.  
Decoupling occurs in many areas of policy. For instance, the 
federal government used to require transportation providers (railroads, 
airlines, and so on) to provide service to unprofitable routes.142 The 
government effectively subsidized those routes through price 
regulation—setting higher than market prices for profitable routes and 
forbidding new entrants from undercutting those prices. In the late 
twentieth century, though, Congress decoupled general regulation of 
transportation networks from the goal of universal service. It loosened 
or dropped its price controls while replacing the universal service 
 
attaching trade promotion authority to this unrelated bill is “doing it in the most shameful 
way . . . hiding behind our first responders”). 
 141. See discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 142. See, e.g., THEODORE E. KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20–25 (1983) 
(discussing how the British and American governments controlled transportation routes from the 
sixteenth century through the Transportation Act of 1920). 
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mandate with subsidies for rural transportation networks.143 Similarly, 
by creating a separate environmental regulatory structure—such as 
through the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency—it 
allowed for separate consideration of the environmental costs of 
particular kinds of economic activity.144 Regulation of the economic 
activity itself no longer had to be a proxy for environmental concerns.  
Decoupling is a necessary condition for misalignment. With only 
a single policy instrument, misalignment cannot occur because both 
issues must necessarily be renegotiated at the same time. For instance, 
if trade barriers are both the means of regulating market access and 
providing support for labor markets, renegotiating trade barriers will 
necessarily activate constituencies interested in both of those issues. 
Misalignment can only occur once two interdependent issues can be 
renegotiated separately. These separate renegotiations introduce the 
possibility that lawmakers will not take into account the costs of a 
policy on another interdependent issue area. 
Decoupling, of course, does not remove the possibility that two 
different issue groups will bargain over how a single policy instrument 
should be used. Import-competing interests, most notably labor, 
continue to oppose new trade agreements the government proposes.145 
But decoupling saps political support for this kind of linkage. It provides 
lawmakers with an argument that particular policy issues (e.g., labor 
market policies) should be dealt with through particular policy 
instruments (adjustment assistance).  
Significantly, decoupling is a necessary regulatory innovation to 
enable the “two-step” model of trade policy.146 Under that model, 
advocates urge that the government pursue trade liberalization without 
concern for its effects on labor markets or environmental issues and 
instead address those problems through domestic policy.147 Decoupling 
provides the domestic legal and policy tools that allow politicians to 
endorse this view of how trade should be regulated. More generally, 
 
 143. See Essential Air Service, supra note 134; History and Mission, NAT’L RURAL TRANSIT 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, https://www.nationalrtap.org/About/History-and-Mission (last visited Dec. 
26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/C2YX-NL4N] (providing funding “to establish and maintain transit 
systems in communities with populations under 50,000”). 
 144. See RICHARD NIXON, REORGANIZATION PLANS NOS. 3 AND 4 OF 1970, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-
366, at 1 (1970) (collecting environmental responsibilities from other agencies and vesting them in 
a new Environmental Protection Agency); see also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. 
L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)). 
 145. Vicki Needham, Labor, Environmental Groups Call on Congress to Oppose TPP, HILL 
(May 23, 2016, 3:19 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/280938-labor-environmental-
groups-call-on-congress-to-oppose-tpp [https://perma.cc/9XGU-U34X] (describing labor unions’ 
opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership).  
 146. See Shaffer, supra note 69, at 2–3 (describing the two-step model). 
 147. See id.  
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decoupling is an overlooked innovation that has aided the political push 
for deregulation. Deregulating industries becomes politically easier 
when the competing objectives of deregulation are separated and each 
are assigned their own policy instrument.  
Decoupling, in other words, creates political space for more 
single-issue bargaining. In traditional economic thinking, this single-
issue bargaining is a virtue.148 As I explain below, though, in the 
absence of credible commitments to renegotiate interdependent issues 
together, decoupling turns into a vice. 
3. Absence of Credible Commitments  
Finally, misalignment requires the absence of credible 
commitments to renegotiate the two policy instruments together.149 In 
enacting an initial bargain, Congress can decide that it will revisit 
certain parts of the bargain but not others. The consequence is that 
different provisions of the bargain are subject to different default rules 
on renegotiation. Trade adjustment assistance programs expire if 
Congress does not renegotiate. Trade liberalization provisions in 
legislation only expire if Congress does renegotiate, while trade 
agreements only terminate if the United States (or another state party) 
affirmatively withdraws.150 Of course, getting Congress to take 
affirmative action is considerably tougher than getting it to take no 
action. This status quo bias is true of all legislatures, but has been 
especially true of the U.S. Congress as political polarization has grown 
in recent years. Congressional output in recent years, in terms of 
 
 148. See discussion supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 149. A credible commitment is one that binds actors across time and space. See Douglass C. 
North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 11, 11 
(1993).  
 150. One possible, and modest, limit on this inaction is the common practice of including 
clauses in trade agreement implementation acts purporting to sunset the legislation if U.S. 
participation in the agreement ceases. See United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, § 107, 125 Stat. 428, 432 (2011) (“On the date on which 
the Agreement terminates, this Act . . . and the amendments made by this Act . . . shall cease to 
have effect.”); Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, § 107(d), 119 Stat. 462, 466 (2005) (“On the date on which 
the Agreement ceases to be in force with respect to the United States, the provisions of the Act 
(other than this subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to have effect.”). 
However, these clauses are only triggered if either the agreement terminates because other parties 
withdraw, or if the president withdraws the United States from the agreement. Such withdrawals 
rarely occur and thus, ex ante, are unlikely to force Congress’s hand.  Moreover, as noted above, 
see discussion supra note 28, these untested sunset provisions are likely unconstitutional under 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998).  
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statutes passed, has been among the lowest in the United States’ 240-
year history.151  
When two interdependent and decoupled policies are 
renegotiated together, the odds of getting an agreement that furthers 
both policies is at its maximum. Legislatures are multimember bodies 
that operate by majority or supermajority rule.152 Proponents of a 
particular measure, such as trade liberalization or trade adjustment 
assistance, must assemble a coalition to enact their proposal. Many 
measures will not, however, command the necessary support on their 
own. As a consequence, a measure’s supporters will frequently seek to 
build coalitions by packaging multiple measures together into a single 
bill or by trading votes across different bills.153 Renegotiating 
interdependent issues together allows for these coalitions to form across 
the two interdependent issues. The ultimate package that emerges will 
reflect the relative political strength of two groups of issue advocates, 
but the possibility of a bargain that responds to both issues increases 
when they are renegotiated together.154   
By contrast, in the absence of a credible commitment to 
renegotiate together, advocates of the issue that must be renegotiated 
more frequently will likely have to do so without the benefit of being 
able to tie their issue to its most natural companion issue. If the issue 
does not enjoy majority support on its own, advocates are left looking 
for other issues around which they can build coalitions. As with the 
example of tying trade promotion authority to public safety workers’ 
pensions in 2015, such coalitions may form if political circumstances 
happen to work out.155 But the natural constituency for a deal—those 
in favor of a particular policy goal in regard to the interdependent 
issue—will have no incentive to participate. The absence of a credible 
 
 151. Chris Cillizza, Yes, President Obama Is Right. The 113th Congress Will Be the Least 
Productive in History., WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2014, 11:33 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/10/president-obama-said-the-113th-congress-is-the-least-productive-
ever-is-he-right/ [https://perma.cc/3CXC-QYPH]. 
 152. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-563, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
ON THE HOUSE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2019) (describing how “a majority of Members should 
ultimately be able to work their will on the floor”); VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
96-548, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE SENATE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 8 (2019) (describing 
when simple majority and supermajority votes are required). 
 153. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 52–53 (2000) (describing and 
analyzing legislative bargaining and vote trading in economic terms).  
 154. Of course, if one policy commands sufficient support in a legislature, independent of how 
the legislature’s members feel about the other policy, then this kind of bargaining is irrelevant. In 
such a situation, the alignment or misalignment of two policies does not affect the policy outcome. 
However, the prevalence of amendments and pork barrel legislation attests to the fact that such 
dominance occurs rarely on major legislation.  
 155. See discussion supra note 139 and accompanying text.  
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commitment to renegotiate the two policies together thus weakens the 
bargaining position of advocates for the policy that must be 
renegotiated more frequently. 
4. Renegotiating Trade Liberalization and 
Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Within U.S. trade law, the absence of a commitment to 
simultaneous renegotiation comes from pairing short-term adjustment 
assistance programs with indefinite trade liberalization commitments. 
This discrepancy in time horizons results in part from constitutional 
rules limiting Congress’s ability to delegate the authority to spend 
funds—a limitation that does not apply to tariffs or regulatory 
authority. As a result, the implementation of trade liberalization occurs 
within the executive branch, which can use its authority over 
implementation to update trade liberalization without returning to 
Congress. 
Appropriating funds for specific programs like TAA is a two-step 
process. First, the appropriations must be authorized. Second, Congress 
must actually appropriate the funds. As Part I explained, Congress can 
and does place time limits on both of these aspects of appropriations. 
For instance, the Trade Act of 1974 authorized appropriations for trade 
adjustment assistance until September 30, 1982.156 The amounts, 
however, were left to the discretion of the appropriations process 
itself.157 Similarly, the 2015 Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Reauthorization Act extended the authorization for appropriations only 
until June 30, 2021.158  
Trade adjustment assistance, in other words, has a short lease 
on life that must constantly be renewed through subsequent legislation. 
Under current law, unless trade liberalization’s proponents happen to 
be pushing for a new trade agreement in 2021—an uncertain prospect 
given the major ongoing turmoil in the trading system—TAA’s 
proponents will have to look for other concessions they can make to 
attract support for an extension. They will, in other words, not have the 
most natural concession they could make, namely agreeing to the 
continuation of reduced trade barriers in exchange for the continuation 
 
 156. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 284, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (“Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of 
this Title shall become effective on the 90th day following the date of the enactment of this Act 
and shall terminate on September 30, 1982.”). 
 157. § 245(b)(1), 88 Stat. at 2027 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2317 (2012)) (authorizing 
the appropriation of such funds “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter”). 
 158. Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, § 403(a), 
129 Stat. 362, 374. 
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of reduced assistance. Nor can they expect a rush of congressional 
support for the extension of TAA. Fiscally conservative members of 
Congress have for years urged cuts to spending on social programs. 
Indeed, the 2015 TAA provisions actually reduced spending on TAA 
from the levels established in 2011.159 The result is that TAA’s 
proponents are likely to face an uphill battle in pushing for further 
assistance unless new trade agreements are on the congressional 
agenda.  
TAA’s limited duration stems in part from limitations, both 
constitutional and practical, on Congress’s ability to delegate the 
authority to appropriate funding. Current trade adjustment assistance 
programs, such as unemployment insurance, relocation expenses, and 
job retraining, involve the expenditure of funds. As a consequence, 
Congress is constitutionally required to maintain a role in trade 
adjustment assistance programs. The Appropriations Clause of the 
Constitution provides that “no Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”160 The 
Supreme Court has explained that the Appropriations Clause means 
that “the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by 
Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by 
Congress.”161  
The result is that Congress cannot easily delegate away 
responsibility for programs, such as TAA, that require financial 
support. The executive branch cannot, for instance, infer the authority 
to spend money in support of a program that Congress has authorized 
unless Congress has separately appropriated funding for the 
program.162 As Kate Stith has argued, the role of the Appropriations 
Clause is to impose on Congress a nondelegable responsibility to 
approve all expenditures of public funds.163  
 
 159. Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs & Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Fate of Trade Adjustment 
Assistance: The Basics, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (June 11, 2015, 12:15 PM), 
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/fate-trade-adjustment-assistance-
basics [https://perma.cc/3SYX-Q42B] (“The [proposed 2015] TAA program would cap total 
spending at $450 million annually through 2021, subject to certain requirements. For context, this 
represents a cutback in assistance based on larger caps of $575 million in 2011 and over $600 
million in 2009.”). 
 160. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7.   
 161. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976). 
 162. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-464SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 1-6 (2016) (“[T]he Constitution vests in Congress the power and duty to 
affirmatively authorize all expenditures.”).  
 163. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349 (1988): 
Since legislative appropriations power is rooted in article I, section 8, we may infer that 
a primary significance of the appropriations clause in section 9 lies in what it takes 
away from Congress: the option not to require legislative appropriations prior to 
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To be sure, Congress sometimes authorizes the appropriation of 
funds on a permanent or indefinite basis.164 However, such 
authorizations are rare, relative to time-limited appropriations, and 
usually rely on nontax revenue sources, such as fees or gifts.165 The 
much more common approach is for Congress to limit the availability of 
funds to a finite period of time.166  
Similarly, the executive branch might repurpose funds that 
Congress has already authorized and appropriated to offset the costs of 
its trade policies. The Trump Administration has done just this, 
providing subsidies to farmers who have been victims of the Trump 
Administration’s trade war with China.167 Although such reliance on 
preexisting authority provides some flexibility for the executive branch 
to both make trade policy and use subsidies to offset harms caused by 
its policies, the approach will be limited in its effectiveness. Preexisting 
authorities may not, for instance, authorize funding in sufficient levels 
to compensate for particular trade programs, especially in the long 
term.168 Moreover, repurposing funds or relying on authorities not 
intended to offset trade policies may be controversial, raising questions 
about the legitimacy or even legality of the payments.169  
 
expenditure. If the Constitution thus strictly forbids “executive appropriation” of public 
funds, the exercise by Congress of its power of the purse is a structural imperative. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 164. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 162, at 1-6.   
 165. See id.; Stith, supra note 163, at 1378–79 (“[W]henever Congress authorizes an agency to 
receive and expend gifts, fees, or other payments—in addition to the agency’s specific 
appropriations—the legislative authorization constitutes what is known as a ‘permanent’ and 
‘indefinite’ appropriation.”). 
 166. See Stith, supra note 163, at 1354 n.53 (noting that operating funds are usually 
appropriated on an annual basis); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (limiting appropriations 
for the armed forces to two years).  
 167. The Trump Administration has imposed tariffs on billions of dollars’ worth of Chinese 
imports, leading China to retaliate with tariffs on U.S. products, including agricultural products. 
The Trump Administration responded by providing approximately $12 billion to farmers in 2018 
and $16 billion in 2019. The Administration relied on authority contained in the Commodity Credit 
Corporation Charter Act, 15 U.S.C. § 714 (2012), that was arguably not intended to cover programs 
to offset an administration’s trade policies or programs on the scale of the Trump Administration’s 
subsidy program. See RANDY SCHNEPF ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45310, FARM POLICY: 
USDA’S 2018 TRADE AID PACKAGE 4 (2019) (“The primary authority for the trade aid package is 
the Secretary of Agriculture’s discretion to use the general powers of the CCC.”).  
 168. See Humeyra Pamuk & Karl Plume, U.S. to Pay Farmers up to $16 Billion for Trade War 
Losses, South to Benefit, REUTERS (July 25, 2019, 12:59 PM), https://in.reuters.com/article/usa-
trade-china/u-s-to-pay-farmers-up-to-16-billion-for-trade-war-losses-south-to-benefit-
idINKCN1UK2NM [https://perma.cc/DX4L-J3AJ] (quoting farm industry representatives as 
saying that the Trump Administration’s plan “is not a long term solution”).  
 169. See SCHNEPF ET AL., supra note 167, at 11 (“Using this authority is not without precedent, 
but the scope and scale of its use for the trade aid package has increased congressional and public 
interest.”). 
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The trade liberalization provisions of international trade 
agreements and the related domestic implementing legislation lack any 
similar time limits. U.S. trade agreements themselves continue 
indefinitely until such time as either a party withdraws or the parties 
agree to terminate the agreement.170 These durational provisions (or 
the lack thereof) are mirrored in the domestic statutes that provide the 
executive branch the authority to implement trade agreements. For 
instance, Section 107 of the United States–Korea Free Trade 
Implementation Act provides only that “[o]n the date on which the 
Agreement terminates, this Act . . . shall cease to have effect.”171 
Similar provisions have appeared in all U.S. trade agreement 
implementing legislation since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century.172 
This indefinite duration is possible because, unlike 
appropriations, Congress can delegate control of trade liberalization 
policy to the executive branch. Consequently, Congress can remove 
itself from implementing, and hence renegotiating, existing trade 
liberalization commitments in a way that it cannot with respect to trade 
adjustment assistance. 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he 
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts 
and Excises.”173 As a constitutional matter, then, Congress has 
authority over what has historically been the primary instrument of 
 
 170. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement art. XV (“[W]ithdrawal shall apply both to this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and shall take effect upon the expiration of six 
months from the date on which written notice of withdrawal is received by the Director-General of 
the WTO.”); NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 2205 (“A Party may withdraw from this Agreement six 
months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties. If a Party withdraws, 
the Agreement shall remain in force for the remaining Parties.”).  
 171. United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, 
§ 107(c), 125 Stat. 428, 432 (2011). 
 172. See, e.g., United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 110-138, § 107(c), 121 Stat. 1455, 1459 (2007) (“On the date on which the Agreement 
terminates, the provisions of this Act (other than this subsection) and the amendments made by 
this Act shall cease to have effect.”); Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, § 107(d), 119 Stat. 462, 466 (2005) (“On 
the date on which the Agreement ceases to be in force with respect to the United States, the 
provisions of this Act (other than this subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall 
cease to have effect.”); United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. 
L. No. 108-286, § 106(c), 118 Stat. 919, 923 (2004) (“On the date on which the Agreement 
terminates, the provisions of this Act (other than this subsection) and the amendments made by 
this Act shall cease to be effective.”). The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act contains a similar, albeit somewhat less specific provision. See North American Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 109(b), 107 Stat. 2057, 2067–68 (1993) 
(providing that “[d]uring any period in which a country ceases to be a NAFTA country, sections 
101 through 106 shall cease to have effect with respect to such country”). 
 173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
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trade policy, namely tariffs. But beginning with the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement Act of 1934, Congress has delegated to the president the 
authority to set tariffs.174 There, Congress granted President Roosevelt 
the authority to reduce tariffs in accordance with the terms of bilateral 
trade agreements.175 Beginning with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 
and later in the statutes implementing trade agreements like the WTO 
Agreements or NAFTA, Congress granted the president the authority 
to proclaim tariffs consistent with the United States’ international 
commitments.176  
Indeed, the core of statutes implementing trade agreements 
consists of prescribing the rules regarding tariffs. The basic grant of 
authority in such statutes provides that “[t]he President may proclaim 
(1) such modifications or continuation of any duty, (2) such continuation 
of duty-free or excise treatment, or (3) such additional duties, as the 
President determines to be necessary or appropriate to carry out or 
apply . . . the Agreement.”177 Implementing acts typically contain a 
variety of other technical provisions regarding customs duties, as well 
as provisions on “trade remedies.”178 These latter provisions authorize 
the government to impose additional duties in certain circumstances in 
which imports cause injuries to American industries.179  
Depending on the trade agreement in question, implementing 
legislation may contain a variety of other provisions as well. Because 
 
 174. See Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3439705 
[https://perma.cc/NJL5-6B2A]. 
 175. See Michael J. Hiscox, The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade 
Liberalization, 53 INT’L ORG., 669, 671 (1999) (discussing Roosevelt’s Secretary of State’s efforts to 
obtain the authority). 
 176. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47, at 643 (“Up to and including the 2015 Bipartisan 
Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act, Congress has granted the President ex ante 
authority to enter into reciprocal tariff-reducing agreements and to proclaim tariffs on the basis of 
such agreements.”).  
 177. United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, 
§ 201(a), 125 Stat. 428, 432–33 (2011); see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, § 111(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4819–20 (1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (2012)) 
(granting the president similar authority with respect to the World Trade Organization).  
 178. See, e.g., §§ 201–208, 301, 311–16, 321, 331–38, 341, 125 Stat. at 428, 432–460 (discussing 
customs provisions and relief from imports in the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act); §§ 201–10, 301, 311–16, 321–28, 331, 119 Stat. 467–95 (discussing customs 
provisions and relief from imports in the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States 
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act). 
 179. Under WTO rules, countries are authorized to derogate from their WTO commitments in 
order to countervail illegal subsidies, bring actions against exporters “dumping” their product (that 
is, selling it at unfairly low prices), and temporarily limit imports in order to “safeguard” domestic 
industries. See Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, Etc., WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/6KEN-A5FJ] (describing antidumping actions, countervailing duties, and limits 
on imports). 
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U.S. tariffs are already so low, modern U.S. trade agreements are more 
important for their regulatory effects. Consequently, the other 
provisions in implementing legislation often involve delegations of 
regulatory authority to the executive branch. These grants of authority 
can allow significant room for the executive branch to change how trade 
agreements are implemented without having to return to Congress. 
Moreover, the existence of an international agreement provides both 
another means to revise the implementation of trade policy as well as 
an institutional vehicle to reinforce the executive branch’s commitment 
to trade liberalization. No equivalent mechanism reinforces the 
government’s commitment to adjustment assistance.  
Rules for international dispute resolution illustrate the point. 
Modern trade agreements all contain state-to-state dispute resolution 
mechanisms.180 By far the most significant of these mechanisms is the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), which provides for 
the adjudication of trade disputes by panels and for appeals to the 
WTO’s Appellate Body.181 Governments can and have used the DSU to 
challenge regulations adopted by administrative agencies in the United 
States. For instance, in the famous Shrimp-Turtle case, Malaysia, 
Thailand, India, and Pakistan challenged a ban on the import of shrimp 
into the United States that had not been caught using technology that 
kept sea turtles safe.182 After the United States lost the case, the U.S. 
State Department changed the governing regulations to comply with 
the WTO Appellate Body’s decision.183 More recently, in the United 
States–Country of Origin Labeling (“COOL”) case, Mexico and Canada 
challenged U.S. statutes and regulations imposing labeling 
requirements on beef and pork.184 Again, after the United States lost 
 
 180. See, e.g., KORUS, supra note 27, art. 22; Dominican Republic-Central America-United 
States Free Trade Agreement art. 20, Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514. Preferential trade agreements, 
but not the WTO, also contain investor-state dispute settlement provisions that allow private 
parties to bring cases directly against governments for violations of the investment provisions of 
an agreement. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 27, at ch. 11, § B (providing for procedures governing 
disputes between a party and “an investor of another party”).  
 181. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures] (establishing the Dispute Settlement Body). 
 182. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
 183. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 31, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) (“The United States contends that it has proceeded to remedy 
this aspect of unjustifiable discrimination identified by the Appellate Body.”). 
 184. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS386/AB/R (June 29, 2012). 
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the initial case, it responded by trying to change administrative 
regulations to bring itself into compliance.185 
Like changes to tariffs, these changes to administrative 
regulations are authorized, within limits, by implementation acts. The 
Uruguay Round Agreements Implementation Act explicitly 
contemplates that the executive branch may change regulations in 
response to adverse decisions from the WTO, provided that it notifies 
and consults with Congress and engages in public notice and 
comment.186 Such new regulations must still conform to ordinary 
principles of administrative law. But the authority to regulate based on 
the decisions of an international tribunal is a significant concession 
from Congress. In a wide range of trade disputes, this authority will 
permit the executive branch to modify U.S. regulations without 
obtaining formal consent from Congress. To be sure, the consultation 
provisions mean that members of Congress can pressure the executive 
branch to regulate in ways they might prefer. And Congress of course 
retains the ability to override executive branch regulations through 
subsequent legislation. But barring such legislation, Congress has 
acquiesced, on an indefinite basis, to the executive branch’s authority 
to regulate in any area in order to bring the United States into 
compliance with its trade liberalization obligations.   
 
*        *        * 
 
We can state the point more generally. Interdependent policy 
instruments in which one instrument is a tax or regulatory program 
and the other is a fiscal program are at a high risk of misalignment. 
Regulatory laws—ones that directly govern the conduct of private 
actors—can constitutionally be delegated to the executive branch and, 
as a practical matter, usually are. Their ongoing implementation is 
therefore negotiated and contested in an environment with relatively 
low transaction costs. Regulations on market access, environmental 
regulations, and price controls can all have indefinite durations.187 But 
Congress cannot (as a constitutional matter) and does not (as a practical 
 
 185. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico, ¶¶ 1.4–1.6, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS386/AB/RW (May 18, 2015) (describing the USDA’s final rule complying with the DSB’s 
initial recommendations).  
 186. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g), 108 Stat. 4809, 4830–
31 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3533 (2012)) (describing the process by which a department or agency 
can amend regulations deemed inconsistent with the Agreements by a dispute settlement body).  
 187. Congress can, of course, also make them subject to sunsets or revisit them at any time it 
wants. 
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matter) delegate away responsibility for reauthorizing fiscal programs. 
As a consequence, fiscal programs are almost always of limited duration 
and can entail tremendous costs in their renewal.188 The result of this 
disconnect is misalignment.  
B. Welfare Implications  
Misaligned lawmaking, which exists when these three factors—
interdependence, decoupling, and a lack of credible commitments—are 
present, explains why eminent commentators like Paul Krugman, 
Maurice Obstfeld, Gregory Mankiw, and Simon Lester are mistaken 
when they argue that the costs of trade liberalization can be more 
effectively dealt with outside of trade policy.189 Although they do not 
conceive of it in this way, the “two-step” model for which they advocate 
is essentially an argument for decoupling interdependent policies like 
trade liberalization and trade adjustment assistance. Such decoupling, 
the argument goes, is more efficient because it allows direct responses 
to each policy problem.190  
Their argument is right as far as it goes. If adjustment policies 
kept pace with demands created by trade liberalization, using two 
different policy instruments might make sense. But the argument for 
keeping adjustment policy distinct from trade policy fails to take into 
consideration the law and institutions through which these two 
decoupled policies must pass. Lawmakers are not disinterested 
technocrats making policy. They are politicians with varying 
preferences. Moreover, legislators bargain over policies in an iterative 
fashion, revisiting and revising legislation over time. The terms of an 
initial legislative bargain can structure that future bargaining in a way 
that affects outcomes. Decoupling may in theory enable more direct, 
efficient policy responses. But completely separating two 
interdependent issues—which is what occurs when interdependent, 
decoupled policies are not renegotiated together—removes the 
 
 188. The recent shutdown of the government by the Trump Administration in an effort to 
obtain funding for a border wall illustrates the point. See Steve Holland & Richard Cowan, Backing 
Down, Trump Agrees to End Shutdown Without Border Wall Money, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2019, 5:06 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-shutdown/backing-down-trump-agrees-to-end-
shutdown-without-border-wall-money-idUSKCN1PJ126 [https://perma.cc/L2ZU-RA76]. 
 189. See KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 14; Lester, supra note 16, at 414 (“But query 
whether trade restrictions are really the best approach . . . to protect domestic labor 
standards[ ].”); Mankiw, supra note 14. 
 190. See supra Section I.B. 
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incentives for politicians who are bargaining to take into account the 
costs created by interdependent policies.191  
In other words, decoupling without making credible 
commitments to renegotiate interdependent policies together can have 
significant welfare consequences. The beneficiaries of provisions subject 
to more frequent renegotiation are likely to enjoy the benefits for which 
they bargained for a much shorter period of time than the beneficiaries 
of policies not subject to renegotiation. Moreover, in seeking to extend 
benefits for a program subject to renegotiation, advocates will 
frequently have to bargain with less leverage than they had at the time 
of the initial bargain. After all, the initial measure to which they lent 
their support is not up for renegotiation.  
To see how this bargaining dynamic plays out and its welfare 
consequences, consider two constituencies bargaining over two policies, 
trade liberalization and adjustment assistance. Imagine they strike a 
bargain that lowers tariffs on a range of products in exchange for 
funding adjustment assistance policies, such as job retraining and 
relocation subsidies. Further imagine that the bargain is misaligned as 
described above. Trade liberalization and labor market support in 
import-competing sectors are interdependent. Increased market access 
(i.e., lower trade barriers) hurts import-competing domestic industries, 
creating a demand for labor market adjustment policies. Trade 
liberalization and labor market support have also been decoupled 
through the creation of adjustment assistance. Politicians can bargain 
over a policy on trade liberalization and a policy on adjustment 
assistance, which saps some of the political rationale for using tariffs as 
a means of labor market support. Imagine also that legislators 
authorize an indefinite reduction in tariffs, while authorizing trade 
adjustment assistance for only five years.  
In the first five years, both constituencies benefit from the 
bargain. Absent legislative action, however, the bargain favors the side 
whose policy choice is entrenched through an indefinite duration—here, 
proponents of trade liberalization. Because those benefits are not 
subject to renegotiation, they continue to accrue in successive years. On 
the other hand, without renegotiation, proponents of adjustment 
assistance will lose their benefits. If they (or more accurately their 
representatives in Congress) do renegotiate, they can expect to see their 
benefits cut unless they offer additional concessions, such as either a 
 
 191. See, e.g., Sallie James, Maladjusted: The Misguided Policy of “Trade Adjustment 
Assistance,” CATO INST. 1 (Nov. 2007), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbp-
026.pdf [https://perma.cc/W253-TVDT] (“The very existence of trade adjustment assistance 
perpetuates the myth that freeing trade creates special ‘victims’ who deserve special programs 
simply because of the reason for their unemployment.”).  
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reduction in benefits under adjustment assistance or further trade 
liberalization concessions. Their welfare from the initial deal thus 
declines in later years. 
In principle, these declines in one group’s welfare from a 
legislative bargain might not concern us. Under basic economic theory, 
rational parties to a bargain assess what they get in terms of its net 
present value.192 In striking the deal, one party might receive all of its 
benefits up front (TAA recipients), while the other party receives its 
benefits over time (trade liberalization proponents). But both parties 
should willingly make the agreement as long as, at the time of the 
bargain, both sides sufficiently value the future stream of benefits.  For 
instance, if labor interests receive sufficient trade adjustment 
assistance in the early years of a trade agreement to offset all of the 
costs of trade liberalization going forward, then social welfare may well 
be maximized through a misaligned bargain.  
1. Misaligned Renegotiation in the Presence of Uncertainty 
Three conditions, however, make it likely that a misaligned 
bargain will both hurt the beneficiaries of a policy that must be 
renegotiated as well as cause a drop in their social welfare. 
First, the parties will often be uncertain about the exact 
distribution of costs and benefits over time.193 That uncertainty can 
mean that a party receives less, sometimes substantially less, from a 
bargain than it expected to receive. For instance, a policy instrument 
may not work as originally envisioned, or an economic shock might 
cause the distribution of costs and benefits to be different from what the 
parties initially imagined. The adversely affected party will seek to 
renegotiate, but if the legislative bargain is misaligned, they will be at 
a disadvantage in doing so.  
More concretely, the actual costs from trade liberalization may 
be greater in future periods than the parties initially anticipated, or 
TAA’s effectiveness at helping labor transition may be lower. Labor 
interests might, for instance, initially believe that trade adjustment 
assistance policies are only necessary for a short period of time. If labor 
markets adjust within five years, adjustment policies will no longer be 
 
 192. See, e.g., Carlo Alberto Magni, Investment Decisions, Net Present Value and Bounded 
Rationality, 9 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 967, 967 (2009) (explaining that the net present value theory is 
considered by most scholars a “theoretically sound” model). 
 193. See Barbara Koremenos, Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement 
Flexibility, 55 INT’L ORG. 289, 293 (2001) (indicating that distributional uncertainty is pervasive); 
Timothy Meyer, Shifting Sands: Power, Uncertainty and the Form of International Legal 
Cooperation, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161, 175 (2016) (discussing the effect of uncertainty concerning 
the distribution of costs and benefits upon state action). 
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necessary. If labor markets continue to suffer from trade liberalization 
policies adopted as part of the initial bargain, then TAA proponents will 
wish to renegotiate to take account of new circumstances or new 
information. They will, however, have given up their leverage in 
negotiations if trade liberalization is not also up for renegotiation.  
Notice that this uncertainty is a risk only for TAA proponents, 
not for trade liberalization proponents. To see why, consider that if 
either side does better than it expects, it has no incentive to renegotiate. 
If adjustment costs are less than expected, the extra adjustment 
assistance is a windfall for TAA proponents. Likewise, greater-than-
expected trade liberalization benefits are a bonus.  
The consequences are not reciprocal, however, if the situation 
turns out worse for one side. If the costs of trade liberalization turn out 
to be greater than expected, TAA proponents must renegotiate in the 
next period from a position of weakness. Since trade liberalization is 
not under renegotiation, TAA proponents have limited leverage. By 
contrast, if the benefits of trade liberalization come in lower than 
expected, trade liberalization proponents can renegotiate when TAA 
comes up for renegotiation—an event that is never far off. Because TAA 
proponents have no future stream of benefits at that point, they too 
should be willing to renegotiate. The policy uncertainty that is common 
to the real world, then, represents an asymmetric risk when lawmaking 
has been misaligned.  
Empirically, economic data suggests that trade liberalization 
has, in fact, been considerably more costly to particular communities 
than anticipated.194 David Autor and his coauthors have shown that the 
shock to some communities from China’s entrance to the WTO in 2001 
was considerably more severe than previously thought and had not 
abated even a decade later.195 Indeed, the development of the Chinese 
economy since 2001 has continued to disrupt new industries years after 
China joined the WTO. Over a decade after its 2001 accession, for 
instance, China aggressively entered the market for renewable 
energy.196 As a result, U.S. manufacturing workers who had retrained 
for jobs in this emerging industry lost their jobs again as a result of 
 
 194. See Autor et al., supra note 125, at 235 (indicating that labor rates remain depressed in 
certain localities for a full decade or more after trade shocks). 
 195. Id.  
 196. See Michael Slezak, China Cementing Global Dominance of Renewable Energy and 
Technology, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2017/jan/06/china-cementing-global-dominance-of-renewable-energy-and-
technology [https://perma.cc/X9PL-SWXZ].  
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competition with China.197 From a trade law perspective, however, this 
later disruption arose not from a new trade agreement, but from an old 
one—in this case, the agreement that allowed China to join the WTO.198 
Significantly, existing WTO members must approve new WTO 
members, but that process is controlled by the executive branch in the 
United States.199 As a result, the executive branch can agree to expand 
the United States’ international trade liberalization commitments by 
expanding WTO membership without returning to Congress. Not 
surprisingly, since Chinese accession did not formally require 
congressional approval, no new TAA measure was passed directly in 
response. Indeed, TAA was expanded in 1993 when the United States 
joined NAFTA and again in 2002 when President Bush sought trade 
promotion authority to negotiate new trade agreements.200 In the 
interim, however, TAA received only a brief extension in the late 1990s, 
followed by a lapse in 2001—the same year China entered the WTO.201  
2. Agency Problems 
Second, legislators’ incentives in lawmaking frequently diverge 
from their constituents. Rational models of legislative behavior assume 
 
 197. See Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or Not Partially or Fully Assembled 
into Other Products), Inv. No. TA-201-75, USITC Pub. 4739, at 33–34 (Nov. 2017) (Final) (finding 
“significant unemployment and underemployment” in the U.S. solar manufacturing sector due to 
a dramatic increase in imports). This competition has, in turn, prompted a wave of trade remedies 
cases against China. See Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Selective Enforcement, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 491, 506–10 (2018) (discussing international challenges to China’s support for 
renewable energy).  
 198. Protocol on China’s Accession, supra note 40. 
 199. Marrakesh Agreement art. XII (providing that new members of the WTO must be 
approved by a vote of the existing members); Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47, at 616. China’s 
admission to the WTO did mean that Congress voted to extend “permanent normal trade relations” 
to China under U.S. law. See Nicholas R. Lardy, Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China, 
BROOKINGS INST. 1 (May 2000), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/pb58.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L5LD-7G69] (anticipating the establishment of such relations). The Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 had purported to deny certain countries, including 
China, most-favored-nation status. See Trade Act of 1974 § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (2012) 
(restricting normal trade relations with nonmarket economy countries). China’s WTO accession 
would require the United States to grant China most-favored-nation status, so in 2000, Congress 
voted to grant that status to China permanently. Alan S. Alexandroff, Concluding China’s 
Accession to the WTO: The U.S. Congress and Permanent Most Favored Nation Status for China, 
3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 23, 34–39 (1998); see Lardy, supra (discussing the 
Congressional vote). This action by Congress may not have been strictly necessary. China had 
actually enjoyed most-favored-nation relations with the United States since 1980 pursuant to 
annual presidential waivers of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment authorized by that statute. 
Frederick M. Abbott, China’s Accession to the WTO, 3 ASIL INSIGHTS 1 (Jan. 12, 1998), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/3/issue/1/chinas-accession-wto [https://perma.cc/L3R8-
549Q].  
 200. See HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 10 (detailing TAA reauthorization events). 
 201. Protocol on China’s Accession, supra note 40; HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 10.   
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that legislators pursue policies that advance their electoral prospects.202 
We might expect constituents to lose out over time when legislators 
receive electoral benefits from reaching a deal that does not serve the 
long-term interests of their constituents. Misalignment can exacerbate 
these agency problems by requiring repeated negotiations by legislators 
plagued by these kinds of agency problems.  
In the abstract, agency problems can pose difficulties for either 
or both sides of a legislative bargain. Constituencies differ, however, in 
their ability to monitor and sanction their representatives for not 
adequately representing their interests. In general, collective action 
problems mean that interests that are widely shared among 
unorganized individuals will fare worse in the legislative process than 
interests represented by organizations.203 Misaligned lawmaking 
makes this problem worse when the less well-organized constituency is 
also the one forced to renegotiate more frequently. More frequent 
renegotiation creates greater monitoring demands. Absent adequate 
monitoring and sanctioning of legislators, both the initial bargain and 
each iterative negotiation make the disfavored interest groups worse off 
than they would be in the absence of agency problems.204 
The mechanisms through which support for trade liberalization 
and trade adjustment assistance advance electoral prospects differ in 
ways that create agency problems for proponents of trade adjustment 
assistance. The business community provides the primary active 
constituency in favor of trade liberalization.205 The business 
community’s support manifests itself in the forms of lobbying and 
financial contributions to campaigns. This lobbying strategy has been 
so effective in recent decades that every U.S. presidential 
administration between the end of World War II and the Trump 
Administration pursued trade liberalization in one form or another.  
 
 202. DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5–6 (2d ed. 2004); KRISTINA C. 
MILLER, CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS: THE VIEW FROM CAPITOL HILL 8 (2010). 
 203. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 48–51 (Schocken Books rev. ed. 
1971) (1965) (describing how organizations provide selective benefits to members in order to solve 
collective action problems).  
 204. See infra Part III.A.  
 205. Traditional views of the political economy of trade liberalization argue that end-use 
consumers usually do not support trade liberalization especially vocally, even though collectively 
they benefit enormously from it. The benefit each such consumer receives is too small to affect 
their voting behavior or to cause them to organize. Recent polling data bears this out. A July 2016 
poll, for instance, found that most respondents do not feel strongly about trade policy one way or 
another. Among those that do have strong views, however, about three out of four oppose trade 
liberalization, regardless of party affiliation. Tobias Konitzer, Sam Corbett-Davies & David 
Rothschild, Who Cares About Free Trade? Not Many Americans, it Turns Out, WASH. POST (Jul. 
29, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/29/who-
cares-about-free-trade/ [https://perma.cc/7ZPB-M2GU]. 
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The business community is an especially effective monitor in 
part because of the amount of money it can direct to legislators, but also 
because it can organize itself more effectively through trade 
associations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America.206 Additionally, because the 
business cycle often involves medium- to long-term investments, the 
business community can afford to take a medium- to long-term view of 
the benefits of trade liberalization. For instance, one of the major 
criticisms of the Trump Administration’s positions during the recent 
renegotiation of NAFTA centered on a proposed five-year sunset 
clause.207 That time period, critics argue, was too short to allow effective 
business planning, which suggests that businesses view the benefits of 
trade liberalization as coming over a period of time substantially longer 
than the proposed five-year window.208 Ultimately, the agreement 
reached by the three NAFTA parties included a sixteen-year term 
subject to renewal.209 
On the other side of the equation, labor unions are the 
organizations that most obviously represent constituents that would 
benefit from trade adjustment assistance. Indeed, in 1962, George 
Meany, the head of the AFL-CIO, enthusiastically endorsed the Trade 
Expansion Act that first codified the exchange of support for trade 
liberalization and trade adjustment assistance.210 This support 
collapsed very quickly due to the difficulties with actually extracting 
the benefits that trade adjustment assistance promised. Between 1962 
and 1974, when Congress next considered TAA, the Labor Department 
 
 206. See Megan R. Wilson, Lobbying’s Top 50: Who’s Spending Big, HILL (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:00 
AM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/318177-lobbyings-top-50-whos-
spending-big [https://perma.cc/C8PJ-J5EE] (noting that these organizations were among the top 
five spenders of lobbying dollars).  
 207. Andrew Mayeda, U.S. Wants Five-Year Sunset Provision for NAFTA, Ross Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:43 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-14/ross-
says-u-s-wants-five-year-sunset-provision-for-nafta [https://perma.cc/B6VS-FXRL]; see Phil Levy, 
Trump May Be About to Blow Up the NAFTA Talks, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:25 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/phillevy/2017/10/10/nafta-round-4-brace-for-impact/ 
[https://perma.cc/C33U-MM3V].  
 208. Pinar Çebi Wilber, U.S. NAFTA Stance Makes for Good TV but Bad Policy, HILL (Oct. 24, 
2017, 9:50 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/356839-us-nafta-stance-makes-for-good-tv-bad-
policy [https://perma.cc/E76D-BZ4K] (“[R]elocations and consolidations [and other ways 
businesses utilize and take advantage of NAFTA] require a stable economic environment and trust 
in an agreement that guarantees the rules will not change . . . in the middle of the game. 
[Businesses’] planning horizon is not five years.”). Ultimately, the renegotiated NAFTA included 
a sixteen-year duration. See infra Part III.  
 209. Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and 
Canada art. 34.7, ¶ 1, Nov. 30, 2018, [hereinafter NAFTA 2.0], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/34_Final_Provisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3QT-RQ7C].  
 210. See Kapstein, supra note 91, at 507. 
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approved hardly any applications for trade adjustment assistance. 
Indeed, the first successful application did not occur until November 
1969.211 As a result, during the debate on the Trade Act of 1974, labor 
interests had come to view TAA in practice as “burial insurance.”212 
Yet labor unions have failed to generate support for reforming 
TAA or correcting its misalignment problem. This reflects the well-
documented decline in the political influence of labor unions.213 Union 
membership has fallen starkly since the 1970s. One source reports that 
between 1970 and 2003, absolute union membership declined by over 
11%, a net loss of about 2.5 million members.214 During the same period, 
the U.S. population grew by almost 100 million people.215 As a result, 
labor unions lack the political clout they once had. They therefore 
cannot effectively advocate for changes to TAA or a realignment of 
adjustment assistance policies with trade liberalization.  
Labor unions also no longer command the support of their 
members on trade politics. The 2016 U.S. presidential election 
demonstrates labor’s difficulties. Labor unions by and large supported 
the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton. Yet labor households failed 
to turn out for Clinton.216 Lack of support among these labor households 
helped turn a series of midwestern states such as Michigan and Ohio, 
which had been considered a Democratic firewall, to the victorious 
Republican candidate, Donald Trump. For instance, in Ohio, Trump 
won union households by 9%.217 During the 2012 presidential election, 
the same households had gone for President Obama over the 
Republican nominee Mitt Romney by twenty-three points.218 In 
Michigan, exit polls showed Clinton winning union households, but only 
by 13% as against a 33% victory for President Obama four years 
earlier.219 
 
 211. James A. Dorn, Trade Adjustment Assistance: A Case of Government Failure, 2 CATO J. 
865, 873 (1982). 
 212. See Kapstein, supra note 91, at 509.  
 213. See ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE DECLINE OF US LABOR UNIONS AND THE ROLE OF TRADE 2–
3 (2003); Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the US Labor Movement? 
Union Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 95, 97 (1999). 
 214. Jelle Visser, Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries, 129 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 38, 
45 tbl.3 (2006).  
 215. See US Population by Year, MULTPL, https://www.multpl.com/united-states-
population/table/by-year (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Q9CF-7VDM].  
 216. Ted Hesson & Marianne Levine, Unions Investigate Their Poor Showing for Clinton, 
POLITICO (Nov. 10, 2016, 10:48 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/labor-unions-hillary-
clinton-mobilization-231223 [https://perma.cc/M4NA-HD8R].  
 217. Id.  
 218. Id.  
 219. Id.  
Meyer_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:22 AM 
2020] MISALIGNED LAWMAKING 203 
In other words, labor households broke with their leadership 
during the 2016 election. Labor unions face declines in membership for 
reasons unrelated to trade, but even those households that remain 
union members increasingly supported the protectionist candidate, 
Donald Trump. This increase in support for protectionism is 
understandable if protectionist policies and adjustment assistance are 
viewed as substitutes. The failure to produce an effective adjustment 
assistance policy that sustainably coexists with trade liberalization 
predictably pushes labor union voters towards protectionism.  
Beyond these organizational problems, workers in communities 
that are losing jobs and the social safety net long provided by companies 
via generous benefit packages may prefer a short-term infusion of cash. 
Other solutions, such as investment in infrastructure and education, 
may help workers’ communities more in the long run. But such 
solutions do little to provide them with immediate relief. In economic 
terms, workers may have a high discount rate. Legislators can thus 
claim victory by bringing home dollars to their districts today. 
Misalignment makes this tendency worse because it trades the 
immediate, but ultimately less helpful, payoff for the possibility of an 
adjustment assistance policy that continues working for communities 
over a longer period of time.  
As a consequence, legislators have little incentive to push for 
alignment between trade liberalization and trade adjustment 
assistance. Trade liberalization’s political advocates tend to be business 
communities that take a longer-term view than do voters that need 
adjustment assistance. Voters, especially those that benefit most from 
assistance, will tend to have shorter time horizons and are represented 
by organizations that have contracted substantially in recent decades. 
Responding to this incentive, rational legislators will bargain for highly 
visible cash infusions that they can steer to their districts, rather than 
hold out for more difficult concessions on long-term adjustment 
assistance policies. 
3. Potential Systemic Collapse 
Misaligned lawmaking also creates the risk that both sides of 
the misaligned bargain will ultimately be destabilized. Beneficiaries of 
misalignment may benefit in the short run—getting their preferred 
policies without having to agree to long-term policies to offset the costs 
their policies create.220 But if the losers from misalignment become 
 
 220. See, e.g., James, supra note 191, at 4.  
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convinced that they cannot win in the existing legal and policy 
framework, they may try to blow the entire system up.  
To see how, consider that no statutory program is completely 
beyond renegotiation. Misaligned lawmaking changes how the 
government renegotiates interdependent policies, forcing renegotiation 
to happen more frequently and in a more costly institution for one 
policy. But Congress, or in some cases the president, remain free to 
revisit existing policies at any time if they so wish. Thus, even policies 
insulated from frequent renegotiation can, at any time, become the 
subject of renegotiation if the political will exists. 
In the context of trade agreements, this means that if political 
support for trade liberalization falls to sufficiently low levels, trade 
liberalization—including existing trade agreements—may be in 
jeopardy. The history of trade liberalization in the United States since 
the end of the Cold War testifies to this fact. Presidents Clinton and 
Obama both ran on “fair trade” platforms that called for reconsidering 
and possibly renegotiating the terms of trade liberalization.221 Although 
both took steps to improve the labor and environment chapters of trade 
agreements, neither embraced a more holistic reconsideration of the 
distributive problems trade liberalization helped create in the United 
States.222  
The resulting disenchantment of traditionally Democratic-
leaning labor voters partially explains the election of Donald Trump 
and the current threat in which the modern trade regime finds itself.  If 
labor interests expect to be persistent losers in bargaining over trade 
liberalization and adjustment policies, labor may decide to reject that 
bargain in its entirety.223 They may decide, in effect, that they should 
not support trade liberalization at all. If the complete lack of support 
 
 221. See Meyer, supra note 197, at 501–02; Laura Carlsen, Obama Reaffirms Promise to 
Renegotiate NAFTA, HUFFPOST (Feb. 12, 2009, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-
reaffirms-promise-t_b_157316 [https://perma.cc/RZ98-52Q9].   
 222. Meyer, supra note 16, at 1026. 
 223. There is some debate about whether traditionally Democratic voters who voted for Donald 
Trump did so out of concern about trade policy specifically, economic insecurity more generally, or 
due to appeals to identity. Compare Diana C. Mutz, Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, 
Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E4330, E4330 (2018) 
(“Evidence points overwhelmingly to perceived status threat among high-status groups as the key 
motivation underlying Trump support.”), with Stephen L. Morgan, Status Threat, Material 
Interests, and the 2016 Presidential Vote, 4 SOCIUS 1, 12 (2018) (asserting that economic threats 
were at least as important as the status threats identified by Mutz in motivating Trump’s support). 
The key point, though, is that indicating support for protectionist trade policies allows a candidate 
to signal sympathy with all three of these possible motivations. A platform of rolling back trade 
liberalization signals disagreement with existing trade policy; sympathy with, and a plan of action 
to respond to, the economic insecurity voters feel; and can also serve as a proxy for the distrust of 
foreigners.   
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leads to the demise of the international trading regime, the total social 
costs of misalignment could become severe.  
Data suggests that members of Congress have historically had 
some awareness of the threat posed by ineffective adjustment 
assistance policies. A recent study found that from 1980 to 2004, 
members of Congress that represented districts with a larger number 
of exporters—i.e., constituents that would benefit from trade 
liberalization—were more likely to vote for adjustment assistance.224 
The study found that “[e]xporters and their elected representatives 
arguably support such expenditures [on adjustment assistance] in an 
attempt to reduce opposition to free trade and broaden the protrade 
coalition.”225 This finding verified what members of Congress 
themselves have frequently noted: that adjustment assistance is critical 
to obtain and maintain support for trade liberalization. Senator Max 
Baucus, for instance, argued that adjustment assistance “can make an 
important difference in public attitudes. Surveys show that most 
American[s] feel a lot more comfortable with globalization, off-shoring 
and trade when they know will get help if their jobs are threatened.”226 
Senator Chuck Grassley similarly worried that losing adjustment 
assistance for farmers hurt by trade liberalization would make it “very 
hard for us to win Congressional support for new trade deals.”227   
Previous empirical study has shown that this strategy is 
effective. A 2011 study, for instance, found that voters in counties that 
received trade adjustment assistance funding were less likely to oppose 
pro-trade liberalization candidates.228 The corollary is that the absence 
of trade adjustment assistance tended to increase opposition to pro-
trade liberalization policies. Indeed, the same study found that “the 
electoral impact associated with job losses due to foreign competition 
was in fact larger than the swing needed to overturn the election’s 
outcome” in at least one state during the 2004 presidential election.229 
The 2016 election—in which razor thin majorities in states with 
significant job losses due to foreign competition, such as Michigan, 
Wisconsin, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, delivered the White House to 
President Trump—suggests a similar phenomenon.230 
 
 224. Stephanie J. Rickard, Compensating the Losers: An Examination of Congressional Votes 
on Trade Adjustment Assistance, 41 INT’L INTERACTIONS 46, 47 (2015).  
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. at 49–50. 
 227. See id. at 50 (quoting 150 CONG. REC. S4737, 4757 (2004) (statement of Sen. Coleman)).  
 228. See Yotam Margalit, Costly Jobs: Trade-Related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and 
Voting in U.S. Elections, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 166, 167 (2011).  
 229. Id.  
 230. Meyer, supra note 77, at 17.  
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In other words, trade adjustment assistance provides necessary 
political support for trade liberalization. Without trade adjustment 
assistance, the great gains that trade liberalization provides are also in 
jeopardy. Yet neither members of Congress nor scholarly commentators 
have paid sufficient attention to the way in which the law structures 
that relationship. Misalignment makes it politically more difficult to 
provide trade adjustment assistance because it separates the process of 
approving such assistance from the process of approving the trade 
agreements that such assistance supports. In so doing, misalignment 
creates a critical threat to modern trade liberalization.  
 
*        *        * 
 
Misalignment has severe welfare consequences, as this Part has 
demonstrated. It means that two sides to a legislative bargain benefit 
unequally over time. Moreover, the side that gets the short end of the 
long-term deal will increasingly advocate for the deal’s demise. 
Misalignment thus represents a threat to the sustainability of policies, 
such as trade liberalization, that require ongoing support among the 
electorate. How do we rebuild that support and align trade adjustment 
policies with trade liberalization? I turn to that question in the next 
Part. 
III. ALIGNING TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITH ADJUSTMENT 
Trade liberalization has been one of the major forces for good in 
the post–World War II era. It has lifted millions of people out of poverty, 
encouraged innovation and technological advancement, and helped 
establish peace after a half century of conflict. Yet, as current events 
testify, liberalized trade is at risk. Rescuing it requires grappling with 
the structural problems in trade policy that have led us to this juncture. 
In this Part, I apply the normative Misalignment Thesis to trade. The 
normative Misalignment Thesis states that when political stability 
rests upon respecting the terms of a legislative bargain made across two 
or more issues, those issues should be renegotiated and implemented 
on the same timelines and in the same institutions. As discussed in Part 
II, absent such alignment, one plank of the legislative bargain is likely 
to lose ground over time. In some situations, these losses may not have 
larger significance. When, however, proponents of the losing policy 
continue to wield political power, they may use their influence to 
undermine the winning plank. As a result, neither plank is sustainable 
in the long term. Aligning the two planks in terms of renegotiation and 
implementation can ensure the long-term stability of both planks.  
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I propose three solutions to align trade liberalization with the 
redistribution that trade liberalization makes necessary. First, 
commitments to redistribute the gains from trade could be included 
directly in trade agreements (Section III.A). Second, trade agreements 
could include sunset provisions, aligning their time limits with the time 
limits on domestic trade adjustment assistance programs (Section 
III.B). Third, trade adjustment assistance funds could be distributed 
through mechanisms that do not require constant renegotiation and 
reauthorization, such as tax expenditures (Section III.C).  
A. Internationalizing Obligations to Address 
Trade-Related Inequality  
International trade law pressures states to open their economies 
without similarly pressuring them to provide the adjustment assistance 
that makes trade liberalization politically sustainable.231 As a 
consequence, international law privileges trade liberalization 
commitments, providing additional legal process and diplomatic 
avenues to enforce such commitments. To correct this misalignment, 
governments should enshrine adjustment assistance commitments 
directly in their trade agreements. This could be done in the form of an 
“economic development” chapter within trade agreements. An 
Economic Development Chapter would have three key features. 232  
First, the Economic Development Chapter would create a 
committee of experts charged with gathering data on communities, 
regions, and sectors of member states’ economies adversely affected by 
trade. Indeed, a development chapter in the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”) (as the TPP was 
renamed after the United States walked away from it) already creates 
such a committee.233 Member states would also report to the committee 
the measures they have taken to provide assistance to communities 
adversely affected by trade liberalization. This softer monitoring effort 
would resemble the reporting and monitoring mechanisms under 
human rights treaties. While it would not result in sanctions, it would 
provide information and feedback that could nudge states to take 
greater action.  
 
 231. See supra Section II.A.  
 232. For a greater exposition as to what an Economic Development Chapter might look like, 
see Meyer, supra note 16, at 1012–23. 
 233. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 23.7, Mar. 
8, 2018, [hereinafter CPTPP], https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-texte/23.aspx [https://perma.cc/4AXV-S7T8]. 
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Second, the Economic Development Chapter would require 
states to take affirmative steps to provide adjustment assistance to 
adversely affected communities and individuals. As Gregory Shaffer 
and Nicolas Lamp note, developing countries originally sought similar 
provisions in GATT negotiations in the 1940s.234 They sought these 
provisions precisely because they did not think that developed 
countries’ commitments to provide greater market access would be 
politically stable absent adjustment assistance.235 The Misalignment 
Thesis provides the theoretical justification for this intuition.  
The Economic Development Chapter should require 
governments to commit “new money” to adjustment assistance 
programs in proportion to the degree of adverse effects they report to 
the Development Committee pursuant to their reporting obligations. 
The requirement that states commit “new money” ensures that 
governments do not simply count programs that already exist. Instead, 
after a finding that a community or region has suffered as a result of 
trade liberalization, governments would have to adopt new measures 
that directly respond to their findings. These requirements should be 
indexed so that they rise and fall with the degree of economic harm 
suffered as a result of trade liberalization. Amending trade agreements 
is difficult, so this indexing—which could be done in a number of 
different ways—ensures that the Economic Development Chapter 
continues to require financial assistance so long as it is necessary. 
Equally importantly, if the gains from trade are distributed evenly, the 
indexing would ensure that the obligation to provide assistance 
naturally sunsets.  
Critically, the Economic Development Chapter should provide 
significant flexibility to states in terms of the kinds of programs that 
would qualify. Domestic TAA programs would, for instance, certainly 
count. But increased spending on a general social safety net should 
qualify also. So too would additional spending on education and 
investment in infrastructure, two areas in which public investment can 
most directly create economic opportunity. Indeed, these latter two 
priorities are already reflected in the CPTPP’s development chapter.236 
The Economic Development chapter I propose here thus builds on an 
existing blueprint already agreed to by negotiators from twelve 
 
 234. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 25 n.161 (“[D]eveloping countries attempted to include 
provisions in the GATT regarding developed countries’ adjustment policies, hoping that this would 
reduce the pressure on developed country governments to erect barriers to developing countries’ 
imports. I thank Nicolas Lamp for this point.”).  
 235. See id.  
 236. CPTPP, supra note 233, ch. 23. 
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countries, although it greatly expands it by requiring the imposition of 
binding commitments.   
Third, solving the alignment problem requires that the 
Economic Development Chapter’s obligations be subject to the same 
state-to-state enforcement procedures as the rest of a trade agreement, 
including existing chapters on labor and environmental standards. In 
this way, an Economic Development Chapter would provide an 
international enforcement mechanism that would help ensure that 
individual nations honor their commitment to help those harmed by 
trade liberalization. If a nation failed to honor its development 
obligations, it could be subject to retaliation by other members and the 
suspension of concessions equal to the level of benefits the government 
failed to provide.237  
One might reasonably ask why Mexico, for instance, would bring 
a trade case because the United States failed to implement domestic 
TAA provisions that benefit U.S. workers. To be sure, it seems unlikely 
that nations would bring many cases in order to assist foreign workers. 
But it isn’t impossible to imagine. As developing countries’ efforts to 
include adjustment assistance obligations in the original GATT attest, 
developing countries understand that the political stability of market 
access hinges on effective adjustment assistance.238 Moreover, countries 
do sometimes bring cases to help foreign workers. In 2011, for example, 
the United States brought a case under CAFTA against Guatemala for 
labor violations that Guatemala committed against its own workers.239 
That case, and the greater enforcement of labor and environmental 
rights it represented, reflected part of the political bargain known as 
the “May 10 Consensus,” a 2007 deal between the George W. Bush 
Administration and Congress that led to the approval of a number of 
twenty-first-century trade agreements.240 Enforcement of these 
outward-looking obligations, in other words, is already part of the 
bargain necessary to approve new trade agreements domestically. 
 
 237. See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures, supra note 181, art. 22.4 (“The level of 
the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the [Dispute Settlement Body] 
shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.”). 
 238. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 25 n.161. 
 239. In 2017, the panel ruled against the United States. See In the Matter of Guatemala––
Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE ¶ 594 (2017), https://www.trade.gov/industry/tas/Guatemala%20%20–
%20Obligations%20Under%20Article%2016-2-1(a)%20of%20the%20CAFTA-
DR%20%20June%2014%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV6K-XLJT]. 
 240. See Trade Facts: Bipartisan Trade Deal, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2007), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/84JJ-C5BS]. 
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Beyond the stability of the trading system, states might believe 
that bringing development cases is in their own self-interest for a 
number of other reasons. A Mexican case against the United States 
might benefit Mexican Americans, while a similar case by the United 
States against Mexico might improve working conditions in Mexico and 
thereby stem illegal immigration into the United States. Trade cases 
are also often brought on a tit-for-tat basis, with a trade case by Country 
A against Country B prompting a case by Country B against Country 
A.241 In this context, a nation might bring a development case purely for 
leverage in negotiations. Despite this cynical motive, such a case could 
still lead to higher levels of adjustment assistance.  
B. Utilizing Sunset Clauses in Trade Agreements 
A second possibility is to include sunset clauses or periodic 
review mechanisms in trade agreements. A sunset clause is one that 
causes a legal regime to automatically expire if lawmakers do not take 
affirmative action to extend the legal rules.242 By setting up a legal cliff, 
sunset clauses encourage lawmakers to renegotiate around the 
extension of a legal regime. If an Economic Development Chapter solves 
the alignment problem by making both trade liberalization and 
adjustment policies indefinite and subject to international process, a 
sunset clause aligns trade liberalization and adjustment assistance 
commitments by putting them both up for renegotiation, ideally in the 
same domestic institutions and on the same timelines. Each 
renegotiation of trade liberalization commitments would therefore 
involve an opportunity to revisit the necessary degree of trade 
adjustment assistance. 
The idea that trade rules should be the subject of periodic 
renegotiation is one as old as the Republic. In his farewell address, 
George Washington counseled his successors to 
establish[ ] with powers so disposed . . . conventional rules of intercourse, the best that 
present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be 
from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate.243 
Using sunset clauses to incentivize renegotiation in both 
domestic and international regimes is also quite common. Domestic 
 
 241. See, e.g., Thomas J. Prusa & Susan Skeath, The Economic and Strategic Motives for 
Antidumping Filings, 138 REV. WORLD ECON. 389, 411 (2002) (finding evidence of tit-for-tat trade 
cases in the context of antidumping disputes). 
 242. See Timothy Meyer, Power, Renegotiation, and Exit Costs in International Law, 51 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 379, 396 (2010).  
 243. George Washington, U.S. President, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp [https://perma.cc/63YM-7MHA]. 
Meyer_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:22 AM 
2020] MISALIGNED LAWMAKING 211 
legislation frequently contains sunset provisions that limit the duration 
of particular rules. Examples include certain aspects of the USA 
PATRIOT Act governing surveillance,244 the assault weapons ban,245 
and tax cuts passed through budget reconciliation, which are limited to 
ten years.246 Internationally, sunset clauses appear in agreements as 
diverse as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty247 and the Kyoto Protocol 
on climate change.248 These clauses are included specifically to promote 
renegotiation in light of new information gleaned by the parties249 or 
changed circumstances.250 Renegotiation is even quite common in 
international economic law. India’s new model investment treaty, for 
instance, contains a ten-year sunset clause.251 
Despite the prevalence of sunset provisions in domestic and 
international law, sunset clauses have been used only sparsely in trade 
agreements. Perhaps the first significant use of such a clause is in the 
new NAFTA 2.0 (the so-called United States–Mexico–Canada 
Agreement or “USMCA”).252 That provision limits the NAFTA 2.0 to a 
sixteen-year term unless all three parties agree to extend the term of 
the agreement.253 Unlike other sunset provisions, the new NAFTA 
provision is designed to ensure that states do not have to make the 
renewal decision at, or even near, the time the agreement would expire. 
Instead, NAFTA 2.0 calls for the parties to make the extension decision 
 
 244. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295. 
 245. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110105, 
108 Stat. 1796, 2000. 
 246. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901, 
115 Stat. 38, 150. 
 247. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. X.2, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 
729 U.N.T.S 161 (“Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be 
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force . . . .”). 
 248. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, 
Dec. 11, 1997, 2302 U.N.T.S. 162 (creating a first commitment period to run from 2008 to 2012, 
with subsequent commitment periods subject to further negotiation).  
 249. Koremenos, supra note 193, at 293; Meyer, supra note 193, at 163. 
 250. Meyer, supra note 242, at 387–88. (arguing that renegotiation provisions are often 
designed to allow states to renegotiate in the event of power shifts). 
 251. Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, MYGOV art. 24.1 (2016), 
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%
20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VAU-79MX]. International 
investment agreements often include other kinds of provisions requiring states to renegotiate their 
investment obligations over time, to accommodate a desire by countries to liberalize their 
economies gradually. See Timothy Meyer & Tae Jung Park, Renegotiating International 
Investment Law, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655 (2018). Even the GATT permits states to renegotiate 
their tariff concessions every three years. GATT, supra note 52, art. XXVIII, 55 U.N.T.S. at 276–
78. 
 252. NAFTA 2.0, supra note 209, art. 34.7, ¶ 1. As of the time of writing, NAFTA 2.0 remains 
under consideration in the legislatures of all three member states.  
 253. Id.  
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six years into the sixteen-year term, reducing the political theater 
around an extension or sunset decision that would have prompt 
effect.254  
This sunset provision has prompted significant pushback. Simon 
Lester and Inu Manak, for instance, have argued that the “new 
NAFTA’s sunset clause is one of the most convoluted and unnecessary 
provisions ever seen in a trade agreement.”255 Former U.S. Trade 
Representative Michael Froman argued that the sunset clause deters 
investment in Mexico by creating legal uncertainty about NAFTA’s 
future.256 During negotiations, Canada in particular objected strongly 
to the inclusion of a sunset provision, although it eventually agreed to 
it.257 
Contrary to widespread opinion among commentators and even 
states like Canada, sunset clauses similar to NAFTA 2.0’s are a good 
idea, both for trade liberalization commitments in general and for the 
purpose of aligning trade adjustment assistance provisions with trade 
liberalization provisions. A sixteen-year duration is long enough to give 
businesses sufficient certainty that an investment made today in a 
foreign country will be protected and have value, even if there is some 
risk of the agreement sunsetting in the future.258 Allowing renewal to 
occur at any point during the last ten years of the agreement’s term also 
provides ample time and opportunity for negotiations to take place 
around revisions to the agreement. Trade negotiators can revisit trade 
agreements at any point during the agreement’s life cycle and reap the 
benefits of greater stability that flow from a successful agreement.   
At the same time, having to renegotiate will ensure that 
proponents of adjustment assistance retain ongoing leverage over these 
negotiations. If they are not satisfied with the package of adjustment 
policies they are receiving, they can withhold support for extending the 
 
 254. If one party does not agree to extend NAFTA 2.0 at the six-year review, the parties have 
a chance to renew the agreement each year for the next decade. Id. art. 34.7, ¶ 4.  
 255. Simon Lester & Inu Manak, New NAFTA’s Sunset Clause Is a Ticking Time Bomb, HILL 
(Nov. 7, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/415290-new-naftas-sunset-clause-is-a-
ticking-time-bomb [https://perma.cc/AJC3-KA87]. 
 256. NAFTA Sunset Clause ‘Creating Uncertainty,’ Ex-Trade Rep. Says, BLOOMBERG POL. 
(July 25, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=egV_qJuDMAg [https://perma.cc/JT9M-
D6SV].  
 257. Lester & Manak, supra note 255 (discussing the sunset clause in the final, agreed text of 
NAFTA 2.0); Katie Simpson,  Canada and U.S. Clash over Sunset Clause in ‘Forceful’ NAFTA 
Talks, CBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-us-sunset-
clause-1.4635056 [https://perma.cc/VH6J-7T44]. 
 258. The Trump Administration’s initial proposal was for a five-year sunset, which would 
likely have been too short to create sufficient certainty. See supra notes 207–208 and 
accompanying text. 
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trade agreement.259 The sunset thus magnifies the bargaining power of 
adjustment policy supporters by allowing them to link support for 
existing trade liberalization policies, as well as new trade liberalization 
proposals, to the extension and modernization of trade adjustment 
assistance.  
As this Article goes to print, Congress appears poised to pass 
implementing legislation for NAFTA 2.0.260 Before it does so, and 
certainly in legislation implementing future trade agreements, 
Congress should seek two additional changes. First, Congress should 
demand tighter alignment between adjustment assistance and future 
extension of NAFTA. In particular, Article 34.7, the sunset and review 
provision, could be amended to require states to revisit their domestic 
adjustment policies as part of the extension decision. Even better, 
Congress could pass adjustment assistance programs in connection 
with approving NAFTA 2.0 that could be authorized, with money 
appropriated, for so long as NAFTA 2.0 remains in effect. In this way, 
a decision to extend NAFTA 2.0 would operate as an automatic 
extension of TAA.  
C. Reducing Renegotiation at the Domestic Level 
A third solution would be to reduce the amount of renegotiation 
over trade adjustment assistance at the domestic level. This would 
solve, or at least reduce, the alignment problem by making both trade 
liberalization and adjustment assistance commitments indefinite (or at 
least of lengthy duration).  
Removing the need to renegotiate could be accomplished in 
several ways. First, Congress could authorize and appropriate money 
for adjustment policies on a considerably longer time horizon. As 
mentioned above, Congress does sometimes indefinitely appropriate 
funds for programs, although these programs tend to have dedicated 
funding sources such as gifts or fees. Congress could, of course, create 
such a dedicated fund by earmarking certain fees to fund adjustment 
assistance or by imposing a tax, the revenue from which would be 
 
259. During negotiations with Congress, the Trump Administration signaled a willingness to 
reform and possibly expand TAA in order to obtain approval for NAFTA 2.0. The US Labor 
Department Announced Plans on Wednesday To Update And Streamline An Assistance Program 
Designed To Help Workers Who Lose Their Jobs Due to Competition with Foreign Companies, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019, 11:21 AM), https://www.ibtimes.com/us-labor-department-announced-
plans-wednesday-update-streamline-assistance-program-2860988 [https://perma.cc/67D3-A4T5].  
 260. Mauldin & Andrews, supra note 4. 
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indefinitely appropriated to fund adjustment assistance programs.261 
Indeed, Congress adopted the former approach to fund a trust for trade 
adjustment assistance in the 1974 Trade Act.262 A dedicated tax 
connected to trade agreements—either in the form of a financial 
transaction tax or a transaction on the sectors expected to profit from 
trade liberalization—could fund long-term adjustment assistance 
appropriations.263 
In fact, in the wake of the thirty-five-day government shutdown 
in early 2019, Congress took steps to provide perpetual funding for the 
government in the event negotiations over government funding break 
down. Legislators introduced bills that would continue to fund the 
government at existing levels in the event a new appropriations bill 
could not pass.264 Congress, or legislatures in other countries, could pass 
similar backstops in the event of a failure to renegotiate adjustment 
assistance obligations. This kind of backstop would ensure that 
adjustment assistance does not lapse due to a failure of political 
bargaining, as it did under the Reagan Administration.265  
Of course, Congress already possesses the ability to appropriate 
money for longer periods of time but has chosen not to do so. 
Consequently, tax expenditures may offer a more realistic way to 
address trade adjustment assistance. A tax expenditure is a 
“departure[ ] from the normal tax structure . . . designed to favor a 
particular industry, activity, or class of persons.”266 Unlike direct 
spending, tax expenditures are not subject to constant re-appropriation. 
 
 261. See Frank J. Garcia & Timothy Meyer, Restoring Trade’s Social Contract, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. ONLINE 78, 96 (2017) (discussing how a financial transaction tax (“FTT”) on specified 
transactions could be earmarked for, and adequately fund, adjustment assistance).  
 262. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 245, 88 Stat. 1978, 2026–27 (1975) (codified 
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2317 (2012)) (establishing an “Adjustment Assistance Trust Fund”). 
 263. See TIMOTHY MEYER & GANESH SITARAMAN, A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW AMERICAN TRADE 
POLICY 35–36 (2018), https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/New-
American-Trade-Policy-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/G29P-VFBY] (proposing coupling trade 
agreements with a “winners tax” which would tax sectors predicted to profit from the agreement 
in order to create a Trade Adjustment Fund, or in the alternative, imposing an FTT throughout 
the area covered by the trade agreement).  
 264. Carl Hulse, With Pain Still Fresh, Lawmakers Make Push to Outlaw Shutdowns, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/politics/government-shutdown-
legislation.html [https://perma.cc/RL5D-HFVX]. These bills typically reduce the funding gradually 
over time in order to create pressure to reach an agreement. Such a gradual drawdown might not 
be appropriate in the case of adjustment assistance. In the case of the shutdown, government 
funding is typically being held hostage for a largely unrelated priority, such as President Trump’s 
border wall. Where adjustment assistance is concerned, the level of adjustment assistance itself is 
the issue over which the parties are bargaining.  
 265. See supra Section I.C.2.  
 266. Leonard E. Burman, Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 613, 
613 (2003). 
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Instead, because they take the form of exemptions from taxes, Congress 
only needs to write them into the tax code once.  
The tax code could, for instance, give workers laid off due to 
trade liberalization refundable tax credits for relocation and retraining 
expenses.267 Alternatively, since laid-off workers will often not have 
significant income, the credit could be tradeable. Workers would thus 
be able to exchange the tax credit that they cannot use for cash that 
someone else can use.268 Firms could also be given tax credits for hiring 
workers who have been laid off for trade-related reasons (or, to make 
administering the program easier, in communities that have been 
certified as trade-impacted). Such tax credits would make rehiring and 
retraining workers cheaper than otherwise. From a labor market 
standpoint, such credits may privilege the least competitive workers. 
However, they would give businesses an incentive to improve those 
workers’ skill sets and, more importantly, would be an acceptable form 
of redistribution within the labor market from those who benefit from 
trade liberalization to those that have been hurt. If a dramatic 
expansion of the social safety net does not seem feasible, these kinds of 
second-best options may be more viable strategies.  
Again, the use of the tax code to provide adjustment assistance 
has precedent. In the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Congress created tax 
credits for investors to invest in designated “Opportunity Zones” within 
the United States.269 This legislation provides a ready model for how 
the tax code could incentivize investment in communities adversely 
impacted by trade. Expansion of the credit to firms that hire workers 
certified as adversely impacted by trade liberalization would provide a 
further incentive for private firms to provide adjustment assistance. 
Like the Opportunity Zones in the 2017 Act, this use of tax credits also 
has broader political appeal than direct expenditures. Although both 
tax expenditures and direct expenditures reduce federal revenue, tax 
expenditures can be presented as a tax cut, making it easier to build a 
coalition that will support them in Congress. In addition to solving the 
 
 267. This kind of program would require some definition of who has been laid off due to trade 
liberalization. However, existing adjustment assistance programs already have definitions and 
procedures for determining whether workers have been laid off for qualifying reasons. Eligibility 
criteria and procedures could be borrowed from these programs.  
 268. In some states, for instance, the tax benefits from creating a conservation easement are 
transferable in this way. See DEBRA PENTZ, ROMAN GINZBURG & RUTH MCMILLEN, STATE 
CONSERVATION TAX CREDITS: IMPACT AND ANALYSIS 10–15 (2007), 
http://www.taxcreditexchange.com/documents/StateConservationTaxCreditsImpactandAnalysis.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3DZD-WGVJ] (analyzing the benefits of making tax credits from conservation 
easements transferable). 
 269. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2184 (to be codified at I.R.C. 
§ 1400Z-2). 
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alignment problem by reducing renegotiation of an adjustment 
assistance program, this political attractiveness is a significant point in 
favor of the use of tax expenditures to provide adjustment assistance.  
 
*        *        * 
 
  The misalignment in U.S. trade policy between trade 
liberalization and trade adjustment assistance threatens to undo 
decades of economic progress, hurting American consumers and 
workers in export-oriented industries without significantly aiding 
workers and industries hurt by trade liberalization. Realignment is 
thus necessary to preserve the gains of trade liberalization and 
vindicate Congress’s promise to American workers. As this Part has 
suggested, a variety of options exist to realign American trade policy. 
Congress’s (nearly concluded) consideration of NAFTA 2.0, as well as 
any trade negotiations undertaken after the 2020 presidential election, 
offer the perfect opportunity to test which ones are politically viable. 
IV. MISALIGNED LAWMAKING: EXTENSIONS 
The Misalignment Thesis is generalizable beyond the trade 
context. One way to understand the Misalignment Thesis is as an 
explanation for the (perhaps unintended) negative consequences of 
deregulation that often occur, as well as a normative prescription for 
how to regulate or deregulate without causing these unintended 
consequences. Specifically, the Misalignment Thesis predicts that, 
when the conditions described in Part II are met, deregulation will 
harm certain constituencies even when policies are put in place to offset 
those harms. Unless those new policies are legally coupled to existing 
regulatory frameworks so that the two sets of policies continue to be 
negotiated together, the new policies are likely to receive inadequate 
government support over time.270 Normatively, this suggests that 
legislators should couple interdependent policies—either by forgoing 
deregulation or by creating credible commitments to negotiate 
interdependent policies together.271 In this Part, I briefly discuss this 
insight from the Misalignment Thesis and its application to debates 
about deregulation in the domestic regulatory context, setting the stage 
for future research. 
 
 270. Of course, if the offsetting policies enjoy majority support on their own, decoupling will 
not lead to this problem. 
 271. One important countervailing pressure on lawmakers is to reduce the transaction costs 
of lawmaking. Decoupling can achieve that by allowing lawmakers to address one policy area. 
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To see how this more general application of the thesis works, 
consider that when the government wishes to encourage certain kinds 
of private conduct by the market, it can do so in at least two general 
ways. First, it can tax or regulate private conduct to encourage the 
behavior it wants. Second, it can directly subsidize the private conduct 
it wants to encourage.  
The former approach creates what we might call regulatory 
subsidies. The government does not directly provide cash to a private 
entity. Instead, it uses its taxing or regulatory power to encourage 
private parties to do so.272 High trade barriers provide an example of a 
regulatory subsidy. As discussed in Part I, high trade barriers 
encourage domestic consumers to purchase domestically produced 
goods instead of imported goods. Tariffs, for instance, make imported 
goods more expensive, causing consumers to spend their money on 
domestically produced goods that become relatively cheaper. 
Regulations that constrict the supply of imports likewise turn 
consumers to domestically produced alternatives. 
Regulatory subsidies of this kind are found throughout the U.S. 
economy, not only in trade. In areas as diverse as postal service,273 
telecommunications,274 housing,275 airline regulation,276 healthcare,277 
 
 272. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 
45 (1971).  
 273. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Maximizing the U.S. Postal Service’s Profits from Competitive 
Products, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 617, 644 (2015) (explaining that the Postal Service 
receives “many privileges and implicit subsidies”); Chris Matthews, American Taxpayers Give an 
$18 Billion Gift to the Post Office Every Year, FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/03/27/us-postal-service/ [https://perma.cc/2R48-BEJQ] (explaining that 
the Postal Service receives regulatory subsidies through laws barring other services from direct 
delivery of mail to residential and business mailboxes, tax breaks, and other toll or fee exemptions, 
and the ability to cheaply borrow from the U.S. Treasury).  
 274. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (establishing the Universal Service Fund, a system of 
subsidies and fees intended to promote universal access to telecommunication services); Universal 
Service, FED. COMM. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/general/universal-service (last updated Dec. 20, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/V8S4-P47F]. 
 275. See Harvey S. Rosen, Housing Subsidies: Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency, and 
Equity 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1161, 1983), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w1161 [https://perma.cc/GZ64-R9EG] (explaining that tax code 
provisions which have the effect of lowering the cost of home ownership are commonly known as 
“implicit subsid[ies]”). 
 276. Christine Chmura, The Effects of Airline Regulation, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 1, 
1984), https://fee.org/articles/the-effects-of-airline-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/K49G-JYVB]; 
Essential Air Service, supra note 134. 
 277. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje 
Porapakkarm, Cross-Subsidization in Employer-Based Health Insurance and the Effects of Tax 
Subsidy Reform, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 583, 599 (2016) (noting that the ACA creates sizeable cross-
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and even monetary policy,278 the government has used its authority to 
provide regulatory subsidies to certain groups.279 In areas outside of 
trade, the government often requires businesses to charge some 
consumers higher prices for goods and services, often substantially 
above the competitive prices for such products, while mandating that 
other consumers can purchase the same goods and services below cost. 
The premium paid by the first group provides an indirect subsidy to the 
second group.280 
During the latter half of the twentieth century and the early 
twenty-first century, Congress deregulated many of these industries. 
Just as in trade, Congress often accompanied this deregulation with 
direct subsidies designed to offset the negative consequences of 
deregulation. In effect, Congress decoupled the general regulation of the 
market for a particular good or service from an interdependent policy 
objective. In many domestic contexts, such as transportation, postal 
service, or healthcare, the decoupled objective is universal access to the 
good or service. In many of these cases, the direct subsidies have been 
inadequate to continue to ensure access to the good or service.281 
Two brief examples—federal regulation of transportation and 
healthcare—illustrate. Nineteenth-century railroad charters required 
railroad companies to serve specific routes and forbade them from 
 
subsidization from people with low expected medical costs (the young and healthy) to people with 
high expected medical costs (the old and unhealthy)). 
 278. See Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 797–98 (2018) 
(explaining that commercial banks receive a regulatory subsidy through a favorable administered 
rate of interest on their accounts with the Federal Reserve, and as a whole, received $7 billion in 
interest payments in 2015).   
 279. Just as in trade, the regulatory subsidy often comes in the form of price regulation. 
However, domestic regulatory subsidies often involve more direct price controls than trade policy, 
where tariffs or other trade barriers merely influence the price rather than mandate it. Direct 
regulation in domestic economic regulation is often paired with regulatory barriers to entry. 
Absent such barriers, regulating the price of existing providers is ineffective, because new entrants 
will simply undercut the government-established price. See Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary 
Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 532 (1974) (arguing that firms with 
monopoly power should be allowed to reduce prices to meet new entry competition, subject to long-
run marginal cost and intent to exclude requirements).  
 280. This phenomenon is often described as cross-subsidization. John Brooks, Brian Galle & 
Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1235–36 
(2018).  
 281. A number of scholars have defended regulatory subsidies as a relatively efficient means 
of redistribution. See id. at 1249 (arguing that cross-subsidies may be a preferable policy choice 
because they can be a more efficient form of public finance than traditional tax and transfer); 
Ricks, supra note 278, at 772–73 (proposing that a regulatory subsidy in the form of administrative 
controls on bank deposit rates would provide an efficient means of addressing efficacy and 
distribution issues); see also Posner, supra note 279, at 535 (stating that federal antitrust laws 
prohibiting exclusionary practices are inefficient because the laws are overbroad and enforcement 
is too costly).  
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canceling service on the grounds that a route was not profitable.282 In 
the twentieth century, the Interstate Commerce Commission gained 
the authority to regulate railroads, including the power to directly 
regulate rates.283 It used this power to mandate that railroads provide 
service on high-cost routes at unprofitable prices.284 Motor carriers—
bus and trucking companies—found themselves subject to similar 
universal service mandates, with profitable routes subsidizing more 
remote routes.285 Finally, in its early years the airline industry had its 
rates and routes regulated. The federal government awarded airlines a 
mix of profitable and unprofitable routes, allowing the airlines to 
subsidize otherwise unprofitable service to rural parts of the United 
States with the fares charged on more profitable routes.286 When the 
federal government backed off these universal service mandates, 
Congress provided money for direct subsidies to encourage 
transportation carriers to continue service to rural areas.287 Not 
surprisingly, carriers began to drop service on unprofitable routes.288 
Direct subsidies failed to stem the tide of rural retrenchment.289 The 
result has been the well-documented isolation of rural communities.290 
 
 282. See KEELER, supra note 142, at 20–21.  
 283. See Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 49 U.S.C.).  
 284. KEELER, supra note 282, at 25.  
 285. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Ricks, supra note 278, at 845.  
 286. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 213, 332 (1982). 
 287. See Essential Air Service, supra note 134 (“The Essential Air Service (EAS) program was 
put into place to guarantee that small communities that were served by certificated air carriers 
before airline deregulation maintain a minimal level of scheduled air service.”); History and 
Mission, supra note 143 (providing funding to establish and maintain transit systems in 
communities with populations under fifty thousand). 
 288. See Goetz & Vowles, supra note 133, at 261 (concluding that airline deregulation has 
negatively impacted fares and service available to smaller cities and unprofitable shorter-haul 
routes); Longman & Khan, supra note 133, at 20–21 (discussing a loss of airline service to several 
cities and attributing the loss to airline deregulation). 
 289. See Paul W. Barkley, The Effects of Deregulation on Rural Communities, 70 AM. J. AGRIC. 
ECON. 1091, 1093–95 (1988) (summarizing deregulation of rail transport, telecommunications, 
financial institutions, and natural gas as well as the negative impact each had on service in rural 
areas); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact on Small Communities, 
39 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 452–53 (2013) (explaining that legislation and broad discretion exercised 
by agencies allowed private transportation providers to cancel service to rural areas when it was 
unprofitable to provide). 
 290. See, e.g., Ben Kidder, The Challenges of Rural Transportation, W. RURAL DEV. CTR. 3–4 
(2006), https://wrdc.usu.edu/files-ou/publications/pub__9373753.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A3M-
H6JG]; Steve Lockwood, Transportation in Rural America: Challenges and Opportunities, U. 
MINN. (2004), http://www.cts.umn.edu/sites/default/files/files/events/oberstar/2004/ 
2004lockwoodpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/T36D-2C4Y]; Lilly Shoup & Becca Homa, Principles for 
Improving Transportation Options in Rural and Small Town Communities, TRANSP. FOR AM. (Mar. 
2010), http://t4america.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/T4-Whitepaper-Rural-and-Small-Town-
Communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/97AE-T78D]. 
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) 
offers another example. The ACA effectively required insurance 
companies to provide coverage to expensive healthcare consumers, such 
as people with preexisting health conditions, at below cost. In turn, the 
ACA required that most individuals, including healthy individuals not 
likely to need healthcare services, purchase or otherwise acquire an 
insurance policy—the so-called “individual mandate.”291 The individual 
mandate represented a regulatory subsidy. Insurance companies 
charged healthy individuals more than the cost of serving them so that 
those who required expensive healthcare services could be served below 
cost.292 In late 2017, however, Congress repealed the individual 
mandate, leaving the ACA’s direct subsidies to do the work of ensuring 
universal access to healthcare.293 The Congressional Budget Office 
estimated that this decision would cause enrollment in healthcare to 
drop by four million people by 2019 and lead to a premium hike of about 
10% a year over the course of a decade.294 
A broader test of the Misalignment Thesis in these or other issue 
areas is beyond the scope of this Article. But the examples are 
suggestive and such testing is feasible in future research. The rampant 
use of regulatory subsidies in the U.S. economy, and the deregulation 
of some but not all industries, provide variation in the degree of 
alignment—the independent variable in the study. If we observe an 
erosion of one policy plank following the introduction of misaligned 
lawmaking—in particular, if the policy subject to more frequent and 
costlier renegotiation and implementation suffers following the 
introduction of misalignment—across a number of policy areas, that 
would be a powerful indicator of the Misalignment Thesis’s explanatory 
power. 
 
 291. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 
242–50 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A, 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012)).  
 292. The regulation of other insurance markets also involves regulatory subsidies. For 
instance, regulation of flood insurance rates that kept rates artificially low provided a significant 
subsidy to homeowners living in flood plains and low-lying coastal areas. See Implementation of 
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & 
Ins. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Craig Fugate, Administrator 
of FEMA). 
 293. Sy Mukherjee, The GOP Tax Bill Repeals Obamacare’s Individual Mandate. Here’s What 
that Means for You, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/12/20/tax-bill-individual-
mandate-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/43T5-EW9X]; see Alex Ghenis, The Three Pillars of the 
Affordable Care Act, NEW MOBILITY (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.newmobility.com/2017/03/the-
three-pillars-of-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/M6DM-BKNM] (describing the ACA’s 
direct subsidies). 
 294. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATE: AN 
UPDATED ESTIMATE 1 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-
2018/reports/53300-individualmandate.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJH4-WBM7].  
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CONCLUSION 
Trade liberalization and adjustment policies go hand in hand. 
The latter represent a commitment by society to help those who suffer 
from trade liberalization. Equally importantly, they ensure that those 
who are harmed by trade liberalization have something to gain from it. 
Yet as our current political moment demonstrates, adjustment policies 
have not been adequate to preserve political support for trade 
liberalization and all the benefits it brings. 
This mismatch is not purely a creature of politics. It finds its 
origins in a legal system that enshrines trade liberalization 
commitments in international agreements and domestic statutes that 
continue in perpetuity, while adjustment policies must constantly be 
renegotiated. Rebuilding support for free trade thus requires thinking 
of new ways to align bargaining over adjustment policies and trade 
liberalization. Only if those who stand to lose from trade liberalization 
nevertheless feel invested in the system can we hope to preserve the 
great gains of an open-world economy.  
 
